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Preface 
Katrin Sowa hat sich ein höchst relevantes Thema für ihre MA Arbeit gesucht. Migration, 
Grenzkontrollen, Grenzzäune und -mauern, Visa, Asyl, Aufenthaltsstatus werden                   
momentan weltweit diskutiert und angemessene Verfahren der grenzüberschreitenden    
Mobilität eruiert. Staatsgrenzen und Grenzübergänge werden im sub-saharanischen Afrika 
weiterhin intensiv kontrolliert, umfassender vielleicht als in vielen anderen Weltregionen. 
Derartige Kontrollen sind insbesondere in Ostafrika aus Angst vor islamistischen Terroris-
ten in den vergangenen Jahren noch intensiviert worden. Katrin Sowas Arbeit zeichnet sich 
dadurch aus, dass sie Grenzregimes in einem sehr umfassenden Sinne als Netzwerke von 
Gegenständen (z.B. Pässen, Büroräumen, Stempeln, Grenzmarkierungen) und Personen 
(Beamte, Reisende, Flüchtlinge) erfasst. Sie leistet damit gleichsam für die Regionalethno-
graphie Ostafrikas aber auch für die Ethnologie in einem weiteren Sinne Wesentliches. Im 
Sinne der Ethnomethodologie werden Interaktions-Situationen ethnographisch umfassend 
beschrieben, so dass ein sehr dichtes Bild entsteht, in dem lebendige Akteure ihre Chancen 
ausmessen, Regeln setzen und diese wieder umgehen. Auf ausgezeichnete Weise positi-
oniert sich Sowa dabei selber im ethnographisch erfassten Raum, in dem sie immer auch 
Mit(Handelnde) ist. Beeindruckend ist, wie dicht sie das Phänomen der Korruption und               
beschreiben kann, ohne dass die nonkonform Handelnden gebrandmarkt werden: sie                  
verhalten sich im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten angemessen und logisch. So sind Sonder-
zahlungen an Immigrationsbeamte keine Seltenheit, ja, sie scheinen sogar die Regel und 
es bestehen feste Vorstellungen, wie man sich innerhalb eines Systems, das Korruption als 
Regelfall kennt, regelkonform verhält. Die Ethnologin lernt an ihrer eigenen Situation, wie 
auf korrupte Beamte adäquat zu reagieren ist. Und sie tut dies nicht in einem moralisier-
enden Sinne, sondern zeigt, dass von den Beamten ein gewisses Maß an Korruptionsbe-
reitschaft erwartet wird. Ihre Ethnographie einer innerafrikanischen Grenze wird so zu               
einem sehr lebendigen und lesenswerten "Ausflug" in die zeitgenössischen Widrigkeiten 
einer Grenzquerung. 
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Abstract 
The former conflict-torn area of Northern Uganda has only recently developed into a ‘safe 
haven’ for refugees from South Sudan. At the same time, Ugandan state officials picture 
inner-African migration as a threat to the internal security of the country, and to its Northern 
region in particular. This thesis is based on an ethnographic study in Northern Uganda and 
aims to describe how the Ugandan state tries to manage and control the movements of 
immigrants. Law enforcement practices are illustrated and analysed in case of passport 
control interactions. Police and immigration officers categorize people into citizens,             
migrants, refugees or as illegal by making use of documents in addition to digitalised           
personal data. For this categorization work they further require embodied skills, knowledge 
and networks that they can rely on. These networks are established between various state 
institutions. But they also appear informally between officers and immigrants, and often         
involve payments that are commonly referred to as corruption. This study tries to under-
stand networking practices from an emic point of view, whereby it combines perspectives 
from multiple actors. On the one hand, it presents state agents and various challenges they 
face during work, while on the other hand it portraits the experiences of inner-African immi-
grants in Northern Uganda. All in all, the thesis concludes that while the Ugandan state tries 
to maintain the security of the country through new policies, their practical implementation 
often increases the insecurity of immigrants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Dr. Michael Bollig of the Department of Cultural 
and Social Anthropology in Cologne for the supervision of this thesis and for the constant 
support of my work. I thank the committee of the University of Cologne Faculty of Arts and 
Humanities for awarding this thesis with the Faculty Price. Many thanks to Jun.-Professor 
Dr. Martin Zillinger who recommended this thesis to the committee, and whose thought-
provoking impulses helped me to develop the conceptual framework of this thesis. I would 
like to thank the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne for the support during 
my studies, and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for providing me with a 
PROMOS sponsorship for my fieldwork.  
In Uganda, I would like to thank the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies of Gulu            
University. Most of all, I thank Dr. Lioba Lenhart who supervised the development of my              
research design. I am deeply grateful that she offered guidance through my fieldwork and 
provided me with many contacts. I don’t think this research project would have been possi-
ble without her assistance. I also want to thank my friend Moses Odoki who helped me to 
understand the legal and institutional framework in Uganda. Moreover, I have to thank        
everyone who agreed to participate in this study. Thanks to all of my informants for contri-
bution and openness. Some of you became close friends and make me feel like to have a 
second home in Gulu.  
Furthermore, I would like to thank those who proofread my thesis, namely Christian Sowa, 
Caterina Reinker, Kathi Hager, and especially Gabi vom Bruch. I also want to thank David 
Vinzentz. After Uganda I realized that ethnography does not simply take place somewhere 
far from home, and the only thing you bring back is data. Instead I learned that what you 
carry back is much more than that: you may even bring back yourself as a different person 
- and realizing that can be quiet a hard process. So above all, I would like to thank my family 
for your encouragement, for your strong support throughout my studies, and throughout    
my whole life. 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Pictures and Illustrations ...................................................................................vii 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... viii 
 
Prologue: The Forgotten Passport ................................................................................ 1 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 3 
2. Street-Level Bureaucrats of African States ............................................................... 6 
3. Inner-African Migration to Northern Uganda ...........................................................10 
3.1 Contemporary Migration and Security Discourses ..................................................11 
3.2 The Immigration Law Level ....................................................................................14 
4. Methods ......................................................................................................................20 
5. Passport Practices .....................................................................................................27 
5.1 On Entry Management ...........................................................................................29 
5.1.1 The Border Setting ..............................................................................................30 
5.1.2 Passport Control as Categorization Work ............................................................38 
5.2 Post Entry Management .........................................................................................41 
5.2.1 Office-Work .........................................................................................................42 
5.2.2 Audit Checks .......................................................................................................44 
6. Making of Passport Networks ...................................................................................49 
6.1 Institutional Networking ..........................................................................................49 
6.2 Informal Networking ...............................................................................................52 
7. “Money is the Law” ....................................................................................................57 
7.1 Immigration Law Enforcement as a “Two Way System” ..........................................57 
7.2 Locating Corruption ................................................................................................61 
7.3 Discussion ..............................................................................................................65 
8. Conclusion .................................................................................................................70 
9. References .................................................................................................................72 
vii 
 
   List of Pictures and Illustrations 
 
1 Picture: “The forgotten passport”: Farewell present from my informants    ii 
 
3.1.1 Picture: Newspaper article: “How al-Shabaab entered Uganda”  13 
3.2.1 Picture: UPF poster: “Badges of Rank”      17 
3.2.2 Map: Immigration offices of Uganda      18 
3.2.3 Map: Border posts of Uganda       19 
 
4.1 Graph: Research design        21 
4.2 Graph: List of respondents and institutions     24 
 
5.1 Picture: President Museveni launches the National Identity Card project 27 
5.2 Picture: Immigration officers lifting passports at the 2012  
Independence Day Parade       28 
5.1.1.1 Picture: Outside the refugee registration centre    31 
5.1.1.2 Picture: South Sudanese refugees are getting registered   32 
5.1.1.3 Picture: People crossing the “no man’s land”    33 
5.1.1.4 Picture: Outside the immigration office in Elegu    34 
5.1.1.5 Picture: ‘Frontstage’ of the border post      35 
5.1.1.6 Picture: ‘Backstage’ of the border post      36 
5.2.1.1 Graph: Setting of the immigration office in Gulu     42 
 
  
viii 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CID  Criminal Investigation Department 
CIID  Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department 
CPS  Central Police Station 
DISO  District Internal Security Officer 
DPC  District Police Commander  
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EAC  East African Community 
ESO  External Security Organisation 
ID  Identification Document  
IDP  Internally Displaced Person 
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
ISO  Internal Security Organisation 
JATF  Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force 
LC  Local Council  
LC5  Local Council Chairperson 
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation  
NRA  National Resistance Army 
NRM  National Resistance Movement 
OPM  Office of the Prime Minister 
PRO  Public Relations Officer  
PSN  Person with Special Needs 
RC  Resistance Council 
RDC  Resident District Commissioner 
RPC  Regional Police Commander 
SPLA  Sudan People's Liberation Army 
UHRC  Uganda Human Rights Commission  
UN  United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UPDF  Uganda People's Defence Force 
UPF  Uganda Police Force 
 
 
 
1 
 
Prologue: The Forgotten Passport 
We are sitting in the guesthouse reception: Emma (the hotel manager from Ethio-
pia), Joseph (the bar employee from Gulu) and me (their Mzungu1 customer) when 
we hear that a friend of us got arrested. Bless (a Nigerian who used to travel from 
his residence in Kampala to Northern Uganda to supply goods) ran away from a 
police control in another Ethiopian guesthouse but was caught by the police. The 
next day there is still no news from him. I ask Emma if we should go to the police 
station to find out what happened. He supposes it is a good idea but is afraid to go 
himself as his papers are not valid. So I decide to go myself.  
From the police post at the bus park I am sent to the main station. It is a busy place. 
People enter, exit, chat, wait, and occupy the front desk: police officers in various 
uniforms as well as others, either plainclothes policemen and women or civilians. 
Some topless men seem to be detainees. Next to the front desk I see some posters 
with various slogans: “Your eyes are the best weapon against terrorism” and “Do 
not corrupt us”. I ask for my friend at the desk and an officer takes me to a small and 
hot corrugated iron roofed office. I immediately see Bless sitting on aligned chairs 
with handcuffs and I am relieved to see him, maybe a bit frightened but well. There 
are three others in the room, none wearing uniform. Two are standing near the en-
trance and one is sitting opposite Bless, separated by solid wooden tables. I greet 
them and tell the seated man who I guess is in charge here that I was looking for 
my friend. He asks me to sit next to Bless and demands him to tell me the story of 
the arrest. Bless briefly remarks that he forgot his passport in Kampala and ran away 
from the police control. The seated officer interjects: “We saved him” while a mob in 
the bus park had tried to kill Bless, thinking he was a thief. “We could have shot 
him.” He requires my passport and looks through it. He explains to me that the police 
has been checking on foreigners these days, looking for terrorists. Then I am told 
that the two standing officers are going to check Bless’ guesthouse room for drugs 
while Bless should accompany them. I tell them I will wait for them to return. 
The seated officer and I stay behind in the office. While I wait, we chat. He is an 
inspector in the crime intelligence department with many years of experience in po-
lice work. When I tell him that I am a student at Gulu University he offers to assist 
me in case I have questions for my research. He also offers to help me with my 
documents in case I need help to extend my visa. Our wait is long and I begin to 
wonder when the others will return. Suddenly Yonas, the Eritrean manager of the 
guesthouse where Bless usually stays, passes by on his way to the detention cell 
with water and food for Bless. He joins us waiting in the office and is interrogated 
about why he did not register Bless with his passport number when he checked in 
the hotel. At last the two plainclothes policemen return with Bless. His handcuffs are 
finally removed. The officers open a file from a pile of documents that lies next to an 
ancient typewriter. Again they require my passport and want to make photocopies. 
The inspector asks Bless for money so that his colleague can take the documents 
to a copy shop in town: “You give him 2.0002, he is going to town. It’s your document 
not mine.” As he is broke, Yonas lends him some money for the copies. We are 
given a document to sign. It states that I sacrifice for Bless that he will present his                                                            
1
 In Uganda the term Mzungu refers to Europeans or people with white skin colour. I willingly adopt 
this label that I was often given by people who I met during my research in Northern Uganda. In 
this thesis people are often labelled by their nationality alone, which of course is an oversimplifica-
tion. It may have nothing to do with a person’s perception of him or herself, but is a result of peo-
ple’s categorization from the perspective of the nation state.  
2
 2.000 Ugandan Shilling equal 0,60 US Dollar. 
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passport to the inspector before a week. Now I am getting a little nervous because 
I do not completely understand the impact and consequences of my signature. I fill 
in my name and quickly scan the form where some columns are left blank (like the 
amount of money I am going to pay in case Bless will not show up). We are then 
allowed to leave. The inspector tells Yonas “We come and check your books” and 
warns Bless “I know your brothers in Kampala.” 
When we are out of the station Bless seems relieved and thanks us. He tells us 
about the conditions of detention: “That place is not good for someone to be there. 
Serious, it’s not good.” Twelve people were squeezed into a dark, tiny, and poorly 
ventilated cell where they could either stand or cower down. Each newcomer was 
beaten up by the other inmates, and forced by them as some kind of ‘initiation ritual’ 
to punch and “fuck” the cell’s wall. Some of them claimed they had been in there for 
over a week. The food that they were given smelled so bad that Bless didn’t dare 
touching it. 
After Bless has rested at Yonas’ hotel he comes to see Emma, Joseph and me at 
the other guesthouse. He tells us about the arrest. Two undercover police officers 
came into the bar of Emma’s hotel and asked the Eritreans and Ethiopians for their 
passports. Bless got nervous because of his forgotten papers and went to his room, 
but was followed by an officer. When the officer asked him to bring out his docu-
ments he panicked and took off towards the bus park. He was chased by the officers 
who started shouting him a thief in the local Acholi language. At the bus park Bless 
suddenly faced a mob of about twenty men who surrounded him and started beating 
him, until the officers interfered (not without being dealt with one or two blows them-
selves), and arrested him.  
The same evening a Nigerian flatmate of Bless arrives from Kampala where he had 
heard about the arrest, and brings the passport. The next day is a Sunday, but as 
the inspector gave me his number during my wait in his office, we manage to make 
an appointment. He calls Bless and me to the stadium where he and his colleagues 
work out. There he invites us for a drink while he inspects the passport. When we 
give him a photocopy he tells us that the case is closed now. Before traveling back 
to Kampala Bless visits our guesthouse again. He seems annoyed, and eventually 
tells me that thanks to the incident he lost a lot of money. He admits that he gave 
money to the policemen. Before I entered the office they told him that he was going 
to stay in the cell until Monday, and then would be deported to Nigeria. Bless did not 
have his phone to inform anyone and got scared. The officers then asked him: “Now 
what can you do for us?” He offered them money, and while I waited in the office 
instead of checking his room they went to see his costumers that he regularly sup-
plies with goods. From them he borrowed a total amount of 1.800.000 Shilling3 and 
gave it to the police. Before returning to the office they advised him not to tell me 
about it. I now begin to understand what had taken them so long to come back to 
the office. Before, I was happy that everything worked out so well at the station, and 
I was even a bit proud that I managed to help out a friend. However, right now I 
wonder if my signature of the sacrifice-document really helped at all, or if my ap-
pearance made things even more complicated. 
  
                                                           
3
 This is a particularly high amount in the Ugandan context. It equals about 540 US Dollar. 
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1. Introduction 
This study is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Northern Uganda in 2014. The prologue 
of this thesis originates from my fieldnotes. What is more, it marks the initiation into the 
research project. The study was conducted in an inductive way. Therefore, local relevance 
and incidents shaped the process of developing a research objective and an adequate re-
search design. The main objective that arose in the field and which is analysed in this thesis 
is: What are the actual practices of immigration law enforcement in Northern Uganda?  
Qualitative researchers claim that the first access to a field bares strong and meaningful 
information about the setting (Reichertz 1992: 15). The initiation story above already con-
tains some of the key discourses, central motives, and main issues of the following thesis. 
It first of all deals with concrete practices of state agents (like police officers) who directly 
interact with inner-African migrants. It becomes apparent that bureaucratic practices are 
crucial for immigration law enforcement: documents are checked, photocopies are made, 
forms are filled, papers are signed, and files are opened and closed again. Bureaucratic 
processes might sometimes be hindered by a lack of resources. In the case mentioned, 
photocopies have to be made in a copy shop outside the police station. Apart from this, 
security and terrorism discourses are omnipresent and are directly related to immigration. 
Here terrorism is referred to as a justification for the police control of foreigners inside the 
country. Another aspect are stereotypes, like when the officers relate the nationality of the 
detainee to the possession of drugs. The enforcement of immigration laws does not only 
take place in official, bureaucratic settings but also outside of them, for example in guest-
houses that are run by foreigners. The bribe, also happening outside of the office, brings in 
another aspect of this thesis: the impact of the informally paid money on immigration law 
enforcement.  
No matter which setting: passports are central in situations of immigration law enforcement. 
Their relevance becomes especially visible when they are absent, for example because 
they were forgotten (Bowker & Leigh Star 1999: 3). Because of the absence of the passport 
the work routine of a standard passport control is disturbed and leads to the escalation of 
the situation: flight, chase, mob violence and arrest. The escalation also emanates from the 
migrant’s fear of the Ugandan police and ignorance of official regulations and the immigra-
tion law of Uganda. Threats (“we know your brothers”) by the officers – be they joking or 
serious – increase that level of uncertainty. Because of the missing passport Bless’ legal 
status becomes unclear. The status is restored as unambiguous and legal with its reap-
pearance only. For this, networks and cooperation between various actors are needed. 
Links between immigrants allow the information of the arrest to be spread as well as the 
forgotten passport to arrive as fast as possible. Beyond this, the inspector’s attempts to link 
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with a Mzungu student (to in the future assist me with my visa) makes it possible to quicken 
the process and meet up with him even outside office, and office hours. Here he receives 
the necessary document for the file which then enables him to declare the closure of the 
case of the forgotten passport.  
This thesis focuses on immigration law on the “street-level” (Lipsky 2010 [1980]). It does 
not concentrate on the legal framework alone, but looks at actual practices of its enforce-
ment and locates them in the setting. The most relevant state actors that enforce immigra-
tion law in Uganda are immigration and police officers. Their everyday work of law enforce-
ment mainly happens in face-to-face situations with immigrants. Concerning these encoun-
ters, the study observes the officers’ techniques and methods to perform work tasks and to 
meet challenges. Networks are one strategy to deal with challenges and uncertainties. Ac-
tors try to establish relations that they can rely on in bureaucratic processes. Sometimes 
they are successful, but other times a relationship is not established. Here, networking re-
mains only an attempt. The thesis shows that passports are a main element of encounters 
between officers and immigrants, but also play a crucial role for the establishment of net-
works. Networks as well as situational practices are sometimes informal and go against 
official regulations. From an anthropological perspective the occurrence of informality is not 
to be judged but rather understood from the emic perspective. 
The study is located in Northern Uganda. After calming down from twenty years of violent 
conflict the region now hosts an increasing number of inner-African immigrants. Immigration 
is mostly related to refugee movements from the country’s unstable neighbours such as 
South Sudan. At the same time, there are specific local security discourses and institutional 
challenges for (immigration) law enforcing state agents in this post conflict zone. The study 
approaches emic perspectives on immigration to Northern Uganda and immigration law en-
forcement. It combines perspectives from multiple actors: officers from different institutions, 
with different ranks, working inside the country and at a border post, but also refers to inner-
African immigrants and how they experience immigration law enforcement in Northern 
Uganda.  
The thesis starts (2) with an explanation of ‘street-level bureaucracy’. It touches on central 
debates of the literature on state bureaucracy in Africa and presents theoretical perspec-
tives that underlie this thesis. (3) contextualises, (3.1) where contemporary inner-African 
migration to Northern Uganda and related security discourses are portrayed. (3.2) follows 
an outline of the legal and institutional framework of Uganda concerning immigration. (4) 
presents the methods and reflects the implementation of the research project. (5) then de-
scribes practices of immigration law enforcement and locates them in the setting. This is 
done (5.1) for the border post of Elegu, and (5.2) for immigration law enforcement inside 
the country in the city of Gulu. (6) specifies networks, (6.1) networks on the institutional 
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level, and (6.2) informal networks between officers and immigrants. (7) reflects the occur-
rence of informal payment during immigration law enforcement. (7.1) highlights the unstable 
character of encounters between officials and immigrants, in order to explain why people 
engage in such payment. (7.2) describes and locates practices of corruption. (7.3) is an 
interpretation of an informant’s statement “money is the law” where different aspects from 
the thesis are brought together and are discussed.  
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2. Street-Level Bureaucrats of African States 
For the last years ethnographic studies concerning state agents and administration work 
have been on the rise. Nevertheless, state bureaucracy does not belong to the classical 
topics of anthropology at all. Historically the discipline was rather characterized by an “an-
thropological blind spot” for formal organisations and institutions (Rottenburg 2009: xxv). 
Our ‘forefathers’ searching for stateless societies often oversaw the local impact of colonial 
state implementation. It needed time and new generations of anthropologists to regard ad-
ministration as an anthropological problem.4 
The opposite can be said about sociology. In the context of the prevalence of the nation 
state and administrative revolution (Crozier 1971: 1) bureaucracy was one of the main con-
cerns from the beginning. Max Weber’s writings from the 1920ies still remain particularly 
influential. In his view, bureaucratic (legal-rational) domination characterizes the “modern 
state” as it is fundamentally different from other types of political leadership, for example 
patrimonialism (Weber 1980 [1922]: 122 ff.). For this hypothesis he described bureaucratic 
work as based on fast, precise, clear, and unambiguous decision making under calculable 
rules and laws. Bureaucrats therefore act without regard for persons and in absence of 
personal feelings (ibid: 562 ff.). Their work is centred in the office (Bureau) whereby this 
setting is clear cut from the bureaucrat’s private sphere (ibid: 126). Later on this distinction 
between the public and the private was reinforced as a dualistic principle by other sociolo-
gists like Talcott Parsons.5 Anyway, Weber’s descriptions were never meant to display ac-
tual bureaucracies. Instead he used the methodological concept of the bureaucrat as an 
ideal type and he stated that in reality there was always deviation from the ideal (ibid: 3).  
Later on, the private-public dichotomy was highly criticized as ideological (Weintraub 1997: 
27). Empirical studies of organisational research led to rather different perceptions of bu-
reaucracy compared to Weber’s ideal type, for example the focus on the individual in or-
ganisations (Crozier 1971), or on comradely bureaucracy (Bosetzky et al. 2002 [1980]). 
Michael Lipsky analyses the US American public service and uses the concept of street-
level bureaucracy: “[P]ublic service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course 
of their jobs […]. Typically street-level bureaucrats are teachers, police officers and other 
law enforcement personnel” (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 3). In complex, often ambiguous situations                                                            
4
 In respect of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard who declared in African Political Systems to be ”more 
interested in anthropological than in administrative problems” (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1961 
[1940]: 1). 
5
 Parsons contrasts the public professional role with the private role of an individual. His pattern 
variables characterize them by binary oppositions [for example “neutrality versus affectivity”, or 
“universalism versus particularism”] (Parsons 1951). 
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and due to high workloads and the lack of resources street-level bureaucrats develop 
shortcuts aside formal procedures (ibid: 18). Law enforcement is based on discretion as the 
bureaucrats can only enforce the law selectively (ibid: 13 ff.). Contrary to Weber bureau-
cracy is no longer seen as limited to the office work place. Lipsky’s notions of street-level 
bureaucrats coincide with other empirical studies about law enforcement agencies. Egon 
Bittner for example describes the importance of informal networks for police work in the 
streets of US skid-rows (Bittner 1967: 702).  
Finally, during the 1980ies anthropologists began to see research on bureaucracy as a new 
paradigm for their subject (Britan & Cohen 1980). In contrast to sociologists, they studied 
bureaucracies also in non-‘Western’ contexts. Nevertheless, there are still only a few an-
thropological studies on bureaucrats in Africa.6 These resemble Lipsky’s approach as they 
focus on “interface bureaucrats” (Olivier de Sardan 2014). The few anthropological studies 
on Ugandan bureaucracy argue for example that “the great majority of state functionaries 
do not act according to Max Weber’s ideal type” (Schlichte 2005: 169), and that “a clear 
public/private boundary […] is ambiguous and contested. The boundary may not exist at 
all” (Therkildsen 2014: 120).  
African countries are commonly contrasted to ‘the developed Western world’. Notions about 
deviance from ideals and official regulations are interpreted as signs for ‘weak’ and even 
‘failed states’ in Africa. In this context the overall explanation of neopatrimonialism7 is ap-
plied in a Weberian manner for all African bureaucracies. Against these notions, anthropo-
logical studies show that bureaucracies in Africa work. As shown earlier, deviation from the 
ideal like informality are and always have been crucial parts of bureaucratic practices eve-
rywhere in the world. Analytically, state practices should therefore be separated from ideal 
images of the state (Migdal & Schlichte 2005). An anthropological perspective on state bu-
reaucracy focuses on the actor’s practices in a local context and avoids normative judge-
ment (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014: 8). It centres emic perspectives of bureaucrats. 
From this perspective “[b]ureaucrats are people first, officials in organizational positions 
second” (Britan & Cohen 1980: 20).  
If anthropologists focus on bureaucratic practices, how do they define them? Often defini-
tions are missing. Some authors assume “informal rules […] that underpin those practices 
of public actors” (Olivier de Sardan 2014: 408). This implies the proposition of an overall 
action scheme that specifies all practices as norm orientated or in accordance with rules.8                                                            
6
 To be mentioned: States at Work by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014. 
7
 See Erdmann & Engel (2007) for a critical discussion of the concept. 
8
 Which brings us back to where this chapter started: Talcott Parsons with his action theory based 
on norm and role conformity. 
8 
 
Such views are criticized by practice-oriented theories like ethnomethodology. Instead of 
the researcher to decode a hidden structure or scheme that finally explains an action, eth-
nomethodologists do not claim to be able to see more than the actors themselves. In their 
studies on bureaucracy they analyse the methods and skills of bureaucrats in practical cir-
cumstances (Zimmerman 1966: 60) “that practitioners themselves view as proper and effi-
cient” (Bittner 1967: 701). Rules are not assumed a priori to action. It is the perception of 
practices “‘good enough’ for the members to count as satisfying the constraint that their 
activities ‘be in accord with a rule’” (Zimmerman 1966: 13). For Harold Garfinkel everyday 
decision making “consists of the possibility that the person defines retrospectively the deci-
sions that have been made. The outcome comes before the decision” (Garfinkel & Mend-
lovitz 1967: 114). There is evidence to transfer this possibility to the decision making of 
bureaucrats. As shown in connection to bureaucracy on the street-level, ambiguity “remains 
a core feature of bureaucratic behaviour” (Haines 1990: 264). And for law enforcement “it 
is the management of this ambiguity […] that commonly characterizes the activity” (Gar-
finkel & Mendlovitz 1967: 104).  
This study focuses on a particular type of street-level bureaucrats: state agents dealing with 
immigration law enforcement. These agents come from various state institutions, and en-
force the law together in direct interaction with immigrants. During the encounter immigrants 
take a very different position than state agents in terms of power imbalance. Immigrants 
might lose their business, prospects, home and freedom due to immigration law enforce-
ment, while state institutions and their members “have nothing to lose by failing to satisfy 
clients” (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 55). Successful law enforcement relies on cooperation be-
tween actors of state institutions, and to a certain extend on the immigrants’ cooperative-
ness. “Consensus is not necessary for cooperation nor for the successful conduct of work” 
(Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 388). This concept of cooperation without consensus exem-
plifies that bureaucratic work can be conducted even when such heterogeneous actors from 
“different worlds” are involved (ibid: 388).  
This thesis analyses practices of immigration law enforcement on the street-level. At the 
same time it focuses on practices concerning passports. So far, there are only few ethno-
graphic studies on state officials dealing with immigrants (for example Heyman 1995). Many 
mention the centrality of passports in the encounters of state bureaucrats and immigrants 
(for Germany see Scheffer 1997; for Zambia see Bakewell 2007). This focus on documents 
is found throughout studies on street-level bureaucracy. “[U]nderstanding police work re-
quires attention to the ways in which officers author, use, and read documents” (Meehan 
1986: 99). Passports are a core feature of state bureaucracy (Torpey 2000). On a theoreti-
cal level, passports as well as other standardized forms constitute the possibility of cooper-
ation without consensus. They apply to the concept of boundary objects by Susan Leigh 
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Star and James R. Griesemer: “[O]bjects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to main-
tain a common identity across sites” (Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 393).  
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3. Inner-African Migration to Northern Uganda  
This study on immigration law enforcement focuses on inner-African migrants in Northern 
Uganda. Despite the frequency of migration in Africa9, this research area remains marginal 
compared to studies about migration from the ‘Global South’ to countries of the ‘Global 
North’. In migration studies it has been criticized that many analysts ignore the impact of 
state bureaucracy and the perspective of states on migration (Torpey 2000: 5 ff.). Scholars 
emphasize to include state actors in migration studies (Glick Schiller & Salazar 2013: 196). 
For migration in Africa authors criticize perspectives that do not pay attention to the state at 
all. The translocality approach for example argues that because of the colonial origin of 
African borders international migration should analytically not be separated from internal 
migration. The crossing of an international border is not seen as more meaningful compared 
to any (cultural or ethnical) boundary (Freitag & Oppen 2010). Nevertheless, the difference 
between an international border and an internal boundary becomes very visible in terms of 
international refugees versus internally displaced people (a category especially relevant for 
Northern Uganda). Based on the Geneva Convention the former in contrast to the latter 
have access (at least on paper) to an internationally recognized label and legal status (see 
Zetter 1991). All in all, “there is a danger that the significance of borders, particularly African 
borders, may be downplayed too often. […] Despite their often ‘artificial’ nature, the inter-
national borders of Africa do matter” (Bakewell 2009: 41 ff.).  
Contemporary policies10 in many African countries indicate that these states regard migra-
tion as ambivalent11 (Adepoju 2001: 56). Migration is promoted as economically beneficial, 
but at the same time it is restricted. “[S]ome African countries have adopted more restrictive 
immigration policies in an apparent effort to reduce immigration levels” (Bakewell 2009: 43). 
Nowadays, another topic concerns states, the Ugandan state included: “The attacks of Sep-
tember 11th, 2001 ushered in a new era of international security priorities” (Wright 2015: 3). 
All around the world, security and terrorism discourses become more relevant. This has an                                                            
9
 Statistics have to be treated with caution. Immigration data for Africa is rated as unreliable be-
cause of numerous undocumented border crossings (Bakewell 2009: 18). Yet, it is said that 82% of 
all international migrants in Africa are inner-African migrants (United Nations [2013]: International 
Migration Report. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p. 3).   
10
 Controlling migration has already been relevant for colonial state policy in Africa, but it was after 
independence that governments implemented policies of border surveillance and the management 
of migration (Adepoju 1995; for East Africa see Kraler 2004). Later, mobility was recognized as 
economically beneficial. Sub-regional organisations, like the East African Community (EAC) were 
established to facilitate intraregional movements (Adepoju 2001).   
11
 There are references that ambivalence towards migration is not only a feature of African states. 
One example is the US that tries to prohibit immigration from Mexico, but at the same time benefits 
economically from its cheap labour supply (Fassin 2011). 
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impact on law enforcement practices on the street-level (for instance on policing in Niger 
see Göpfert 2012). This impact is described especially for immigration law enforcement 
practices (for example in South Africa see Landau & Vigneswaran 2007).  
This chapter maps contemporary inner-African migration to Northern Uganda. It also pre-
sents Ugandan media discourses about immigration and security. After this, the legal frame-
work of the Ugandan immigration law and the additional institutional framework are outlined. 
 
3.1 Contemporary Migration and Security Discourses 
We have a vast borderline with eager neighbours willing to come in, and share with 
us our golden cake. (Immigration Officer Michael) 
Uganda is so good. In the morning it was very cold, right now it is hot a bit. See, the 
weather keeps on changing naturally. God has blessed us with the weather. And 
people enjoy being here, I think. (Police Officer Samuel) 
These quotes from the interviews of this study present Northern Uganda as a destination 
for immigrants. Overall, migration has been an integral part of the history of Uganda (Mu-
lumba & Olema 2009: 8). Exact data is not available due to the lack of regular statistical 
investigations, and because of high rates of unregistered border crossings. This so-called 
“irregular” immigration is said to be on the rise.12 
There are only very few studies about immigration to Northern Uganda. Most of them focus 
on refugees, as the region “plays host to the highest numbers of refugees in Africa” (Binaisa 
2013: 3). In the middle of 2014 the registered asylum seeker and refugee population in 
Uganda was 379,668.13 By the end of 2015 it rose to more than 500,000 which is so far the 
highest number in Uganda’s history and made Uganda number three of all refugee-hosting 
countries in Africa.14 This influx of refugees (mainly from South Sudan and the DRC) be-
comes particularly visible in Northern Uganda. 116,000 South Sudanese sought protection 
in Uganda between the start of civil war in December 2013 until June 2014, most of them 
being hosted in refugee camps in the northern districts of Arua and Adjumani15. Northern 
Uganda only recently became a ‘safe haven’. Until 2009 a high number of refugees and 
internally displaced people originated from this area, because of the violent conflict between 
the Lord’s Resistance Army and the government of Uganda. Today, Uganda has an espe-
cially good reputation as a refugee-hosting country. The UNHCR honours the country’s                                                            
12
 Int. Organization for Migration (2013): Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile, p. 17.  
13
 UNHCR (2014): Uganda Emergency Update, p. 2.  
14
 UNHCR (2015): Uganda hosts record 500,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. http://www.un-
hcr.org/ 56741 4b26.html (accessed March 31, 2016).  
15
 UNHCR (2014): Uganda Emergency Update, p. 1. 
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“hospitality and generous asylum policies.”16 In contrast to other East African countries 
(Kraler 2004), Uganda permits refugees to work and move freely, while in rural areas they 
additionally have access to land (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 32). Apart from being situated in 
rural camps, many refugees live (often unassisted) in urban areas (Sandvik 2011). Asylum 
seekers do not only come from Uganda’s neighbouring countries, but also from Somalia, 
Eritrea or Ethiopia.17 These migrants are not mentioned in the literature at all, despite the 
visibility of their presence in urban daily life, for example in Kampala’s popular area Ka-
balagala where many Ethiopian and Eritrean bars, restaurants and shops are located.  
Prioritizing refugees when analysing immigration in (East) Africa is criticized: “Much re-
search is funded by Western institutions and international agencies, which biases research 
agendas. Research becomes focused on specific ‘crisis migration’ issues” (Jonsson 2009: 
13). During my stay I faced a great heterogeneity of inner-African migrants in Northern 
Uganda. Immigrants come from all regions of the continent, they have different legal sta-
tuses, and various reasons to immigrate apart from flight. This observation correlates with 
the “process of diversification” of African immigration destinations (Bakewell 2009: 22). 
Apart from its refugee camps, Northern Uganda becomes a destination for immigrants as 
economic opportunities and entrepreneurial possibilities emerge in the former war-ridden 
region. After the independence of South Sudan in 2011 trade routes from Sudan were shut 
down. The country became dependent on routes and imports from its Southern neighbour-
ing countries. The recently renovated Great North Road from Kampala to Juba is described 
as South Sudan’s “lifeline” (Twijnstra et al. 2014: 385). This increase of traffic and trade 
along the road brings economic opportunities for its passage points like the city of Gulu as 
well as the bordertowns Elegu and Nimule. Not only do the locals profit from this situation 
(Schomerus & Titeca 2012), but Northern Uganda becomes also attractive for international 
immigration.  
To some extent the government of Uganda promotes mobility across its borders because 
of economic reasons. This mainly concerns regional mobility inside East Africa. The in-
crease of mobility is facilitated for example by temporary travelling papers, which can be 
bought by Ugandans at border posts to the neighbouring countries. Besides, citizens of 
                                                           
16
 UNHCR (2015): Country operations profile: Uganda. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/ 
49e483c06.html (accessed March 31, 2016). 
17
 Int. Organization for Migration (2013): Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile, p. 33. 
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EAC member states do not need a visa to enter Uganda. One Stop Border Posts are es-
tablished to promote economic growth inside East Africa, especially for landlocked countries 
like Uganda.18 So far they have not been implemented in Northern Uganda.  
On the other hand, stricter border and migration surveillance is promoted in terms of security 
maintenance.19 Security discourses increasingly become relevant in Uganda with regard to 
terrorism. The Ugandan army (UPDF) is currently involved in the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) to fight Al-Shabaab. In July 2010 Al-Shabaab announced to be respon-
sible for two attacks that were launched in Kampala during the final match of the football 
world cup. In 2014 Ugandan security forces claimed to have prevented another attack from 
Al-Shabaab. A newspaper article 
(see Picture 3.1.1) relates the 
threat of terrorism to illegal border 
crossings into Northern Uganda. 
After the Al-Shabaab attack on 
Garissa University in Kenya 2015, 
Uganda’s president Yoweri Muse-
veni stated that: “the terrorism 
threat by extremist forces is one of 
the most urgent problems facing 
our region” (quoted in Wright 2015: 
33). A worldwide strategy against 
terrorism is the introduction of new 
technologies of identification, for 
example electronic passports. The 
Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairs comments on the introduction of e-passports in 
Uganda: “The world has never been in a greater panic than it is right now due to threats 
from terrorism, and epidemics like Ebola. If you are not e-compliant, you are a step back. 
We do not want to be left behind.”20  
                                                           
18
 Africa-EU Partnership (2013): One Stop Border Posts make their Way in Africa. http://www.af-
rica-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/one-stop-border-posts-make-their-way-africa (ac-
cessed April 03, 2016).  
19
 Border insecurity is presented as the first category of threat for the internal security of Uganda 
due to military invasion, cross border raids, and illegal crossings (Government of Uganda [2004]: 
White Paper Draft on Defence Transformation, p. 18). 
20
 New Vision (2014): E-passports start 2015. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/ 
1312235/-passports-start-2015 (accessed April 02, 2016). 
Picture 3.1.1 Newspaper article: “How al-Shabaab en-
tered Uganda” (Source: Daily Monitor, September 16, 
2014) 
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In case of Northern Uganda threats for the internal security are related to migration from 
war-torn countries like South Sudan. After the conflict in Northern Uganda state security 
forces launched campaigns to unarm the area (Mushemeza Dickens 2008). Now there is 
fear of a rearming of the region. In the media, state agents blame South Sudanese to smug-
gle guns over the border into the country which had led to the rise of armed robberies in 
Northern Uganda.21 Apart from that, the RDC of Gulu points to the threat of the South Su-
danese conflict to spill over into Northern Uganda, because of a possible regrouping of the 
SPLA in the Ugandan border area.22 The presented security discourses were highly present 
in my interviews with state agents, and often directly related to immigration to Uganda:  
These people, the enemy of peace like Al-Shabaab, threw a bomb, you heard it, in 
Uganda. They are everywhere. So that thing signals to us to be very cautious with 
people. Specially foreigners. Because all these acts where committed by foreigners. 
(Police Officer Samuel) 
They have been in a kind of lawless situation for long. So here you have foreign 
nationals who come as refugees who come looking for safety, and they do not know 
what the law is. And some of them are very violent. (LC5 of Gulu) 
Most of our neighbours are not peaceful countries, like Somalia, South Sudan, 
Congo. They are not peaceful. Most of them when they move here, they move with 
guns. They end up destabilizing the security of Uganda, and of Gulu. (DPC of Gulu) 
 
3.2 The Immigration Law Level 
In contrast to actual practices of immigration law enforcement on the street-level, this sub-
chapter outlines the formal background for these practices. To display the contrast to the 
street-level I will refer to it as the ‘law level’. It includes the legal framework, which means 
written laws and regulations that are officially recognized by the state of Uganda. It also 
includes the institutional framework that is the official attempt of the state to provide an 
infrastructure for law enforcement.  
Immigration Law in Uganda is based on the 1999 Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Con-
trol Act (as well as its amendment from 2009) and the 1985 Aliens (Registration and Control) 
Act. These texts include interpretations of different permits, documents and statuses. They 
empower certain state officials to require documents, search and arrest suspects without 
                                                           
21
 NTV Uganda (2014): Insecurity in Gulu. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj2JTY-2C8k (ac-
cessed April 02, 2016). 
22
 Daily Monitor (2014): Influx of S. Sudanese a security threat – RDC. http://www.monitor.co.ug/ 
News/National/Influx-of-S--Sudanese-a-security-threat---RDC/-/688334/2558846/-/jxoc1m/-
/index.html (accessed April 02, 2016). 
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warrant. The texts demand foreigners to register and to carry certain documents all the time. 
These are officially issued alien identity cards as well as passports which include the permit 
of entry and stay. Those who alter or forge these documents, who enter and stay in Uganda 
without registration, and those who remain in the country after their permits have expired 
commit an offence as they violate the law. The two latter offences label a person a “prohib-
ited” or “illegal” immigrant. By law, offenders have to pay a fine, and can additionally be 
imprisoned. Prohibited immigrants will be deported if a deportation order has been made, 
and until then remain in custody. There is an additional Refugee Act revised in 2006 that 
guarantees to be exempt from such penalties to those who have been granted refugee 
status. 
Overall, there is a plurality of actors involved in handling issues of immigration in Uganda. 
In the case of refugees the main state institution in charge is the Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM).23 Concerning law enforcement, “[a]ll the security agencies get involved” (LC5 of 
Gulu). Under the government of Museveni Uganda developed a huge security apparatus 
(Schlichte 2005: 172). Security forces are defined by chapter twelve of the Constitution. 
Additionally, there is the Security Act and the National Security Council Act. On the district 
level, security maintenance is partly decentralized and transferred to the locally elected Lo-
cal Council Chairperson (LC5)24 based on the Local Government Act. At the same time, the 
Resident District Commissioner (RDC) is appointed by the president to monitor the work of 
the Local Council in the districts. According to the National Security Council Act there are 
security committees in each district to coordinate intelligence and security policies in the 
district, and to give information to the council on the national level. The committee is com-
posed of the RDC as the chairperson, the District Internal Security Officer (DISO)25 as sec-
retary, the LC5, and other members that represent Ugandan security forces, like the police 
(UPF), the Ugandan army (UPDF), and the prison services on the district level.  
It has to be mentioned that because of the conflict this institutional framework for law en-
forcement and security maintenance was not available for long in Northern Uganda. When 
fighting ended it was the first time after twenty years that police officers were actively pre-
sent in the region (Mushemeza Dickens 2008: 7). In addition to the lack of trust among the                                                            
23
 The status determination of refugees is done by a committee composed of several state minis-
tries (Mulumba & Olema 2009). Besides, several international institutions and NGOs are involved 
in refugee matters, like the UNHCR, the Red Cross, the Lutheran World Federation and Save the 
Children. 
24
 During war between the Obote government and Museveni’s NRA the latter installed Resistance 
Councils (RCs) in the areas that were controlled by the NRA. These were later renamed in Local 
Councils (LC), structured from the village level (LC1) up to the district level (LC5) (Baker 2004). 
25
 Based on the Security Organisation Act, the ESO concentrates on external security and the ISO 
on internal security. The latter is also available at the district level.  
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local population, it needed time and effort to provide the state institutions with resources 
and facilities to enforce the state law (ibid: 9). 
The main actors that actually enforce immigration law on the street-level, work under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. These are immigration and police officers. 
  
A) IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 
The Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control has various responsibilities:  
To facilitate the legal and orderly movement of persons to and from Uganda, regu-
late the residence of immigrants in Uganda, verify and process Uganda citizenship 
and enforce national and regional immigration laws for the development and security 
of Uganda.26 
The national headquarters are located in Kampala. The directorate is structured into three 
different departments: immigration control, legal services (including inspection, prosecution 
and deportation), citizenship and passports for Ugandan citizens.27 On the local level how-
ever, division work according to this structure is not always possible due to the lack of re-
sources like manpower. The regional immigration office for Northern Uganda is situated in 
Gulu (see Map 3.2.2). It supervises most of the border posts of the region (see Map 3.2.3) 
where lower rank officers conduct border management such as passport control. In the 
regional office, one Principle Immigration Officer as well as a lower rank officer are respon-
sible to provide services to Ugandan citizens and immigrants, delegating specific tasks to 
the headquarters in Kampala, while enforcing immigration laws at the same time. This 
demonstrates that bureaucracy often involves that “official roles themselves [are] multiple, 
overlapping, and perhaps inconsistent” (Haines 1990: 265). 
 
B) POLICE OFFICERS 
In case of the police, the main actors dealing with immigration law enforcement are officers 
of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department (CIID). The fact that the police is 
a main actor in handling immigration matters corresponds with the international trend of 
“policiarization of immigration” (Fassin 2011: 221). The Ugandan Police (UPF) is highly 
structured by ranks (see Picture 3.2.1). On the local level there are regional offices headed 
by the Regional Police Commander (RPC). In Northern Uganda the regional office for the 
Aswa River Region is based in Gulu. There are additional offices on the district level, for                                                            
26
 Homepage of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control: http://www.immigra-
tion.go.ug/ about/ who-we-are (accessed April 03, 2016). 
27
 Homepage of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control: www.immigration.go.ug/ 
about/ departments (accessed April 03, 2016).  
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instance the Central Police Station (CPS) of Gulu district which is headed by the District 
Police Commander (DPC). Police in Uganda has long been a marginalized institution com-
pared to other security forces like the army.28 During the last years, the UPF increased its 
recruitments and trainings. Especially in the North additional police officers are deployed 
(Biecker & Schlichte 2014: 19), but despite structural improvements of the UPF, the UPDF 
is still favoured by President Museveni.29 Army personnel is appointed to high police offices, 
so that the UPF is criticized to be militarized and centralized (Baker 2005: 29). Researchers 
highlight role confusion between the police and other security agents in terms of policing in 
Uganda, majorly between the UPF and the UPDF (Ngufor Forkum 2007: 59), but also be-
tween the UPF, security agents of the local governments, and private security services 
(Baker 2005). 
 
 
 
                                                           
28
 It is said that this led to a high level of corruption inside the force (Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative [2006]: The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda, pp. 3 ff.). 
29
 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006): The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Ac-
countability in Uganda, p. 5.  
Picture 3.2.1 UPF poster: “Badges of Rank” (11/2014) 
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Map 3.2.2 Immigration offices of Uganda (Source: http://www.immigration.go.ug/about/re-
gional-offices [accessed May 07, 2016]) 
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Map 3.2.3 Border posts of Uganda (Source: http://www.immigration.go.ug/content/border-
management [accessed May 07, 2016]) 
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4. Methods 
I ask the immigration officer if he has time for an interview. He interrupts me: “First I 
have to ask you: Are you here illegally?” I think it is a joke but then I realize that he 
is serious about it. I tell him that I have a Student Visa. He wants me to show it to 
him and I give him the black-and-white copy of my passport. He goes through the 
papers, and while his eyes are concentrated on the pages he asks me plenty of 
questions about former visas from other countries: “What were you doing there?” I 
start feeling a little uneasy. Finally he passes back the papers and simply says: “We 
can start now.”  
This research was conducted during a term abroad at the Institute for Peace and Strategic 
Studies (IPSS) of Gulu University. It is about immigration law enforcement in Northern 
Uganda,30 but more specifically focuses on the area along the Great North Road. A fieldtrip 
to the border post in Elegu was possible, but the research concentrated mostly on Gulu. 
The city is one of the major ‘passage points’ for travellers from Kampala to Juba. It is the 
largest city in Northern Uganda and lodges the regional headquarters of various state insti-
tutions, for example the UPF and Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control. 
The ethnographic study is based on an open and reflexive approach31. Objectives and re-
search questions were formulated on the ground, and were influenced by my environment 
in Gulu. This environment mainly consisted of inner-African migrants (majorly people from 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Nigeria, but also from Kenya, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan and So-
malia) as well as Ugandans working with them. I stayed in a lodge run by Ethiopians and 
we used to discuss my research objectives and strategies together. Ugandan friends who 
formerly studied law were very helpful for me to understand the legal and institutional frame-
work of Uganda. Several events finally made me chose the topic of my research. Like 
Clifford Geertz I started to ask myself “what the hell is going on here?” These events were 
encounters of state agents with immigrants, whereby one of them is presented in the pro-
logue of this thesis.  
                                                           
30
 This study does not claim to include all aspects of immigration law enforcement that concern the 
whole region. Northern Uganda is a heterogeneous area with various local issues concerning immi-
gration: for example Congolese and South Sudanese refugees in West Nile, as well as pastoralists’ 
border crossings from Kenya in Karamodja (Leff 2009).  
31
 Instead of testing a hypothesis (that was formulated in advance by the researcher him- or her-
self) priority is given to the field (Flick 2004: 69). The former opposition between researcher and the 
ones researched becomes blurred.  
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After all, this whole research project was rather exploratory, and limited in its scale. As a 
qualitative study the thesis does not claim to make generalizable statements about immi-
gration law enforcement in Uganda. The findings presented here have to be treated as 
interpretations. Fieldwork took four months. The research design (shown in Graph 4.1) was 
developed under the supervision of the IPSS. It consists of “method triangulation”, a mixture 
of different qualitative methods (Flick 
2004: 81). Instead of following a 
fixed structure, the design and its 
methods were constantly adapted to 
the field and to the local circum-
stances in a flexible manner. The 
whole study bases on a circular pro-
cess. Instead of following a linear 
process like statistical studies do, it 
shifts between the steps of research.  
Therefore the analysis of data was 
not transferred to a later point. A sys-
tematical analysis was conducted afterwards when all data was transcribed. But analysis 
already took place during data gathering. During fieldwork I already noted down first con-
clusions as initial “memos” (Emerson et al. 1995). These were reworked and specified dur-
ing the main analysis. In addition to the methods presented in Graph 4.1, I analysed articles 
of the two major Ugandan newspapers, Daily Monitor and New Vision. The articles reflect 
popular discourses concerning immigration, national borders, bureaucracy and security in 
Uganda. 
Some of the main participant observations happened unplanned and accidentally. There-
fore, notes were taken afterwards. These observations concerned encounters of state offi-
cials and immigrants. By the end of the research observations were conducted more sys-
tematically, and concerned everyday work routines of immigration officers. These observa-
tions were less participatory as I was not actively involved in the practices but sat by the 
officer’s desk to observe what was going on. Bureaucratic practices cannot be studied by 
studying the law level alone. In fact they have to be studied “at close range” (Crozier 1971: 
3). At the same time, bureaucratic settings either strictly regulate the way how public can 
access them, or may not be “structured for public access” at all (Nader 1972: 296). Because 
of restricted access to the field, observations in bureaucratic settings could only be done 
partially. It was possible to spend a working day together with immigration officers at the 
regional headquarters in Gulu, as well as at the border post in Elegu. There, the officers 
   
 
PERIOD METHOD AIM  
1st month (Observation) (Focus)  
2nd month Readings Law Level  
  Interviews Case Studies  
3rd month Interviews Higher Ranks  
  Interviews Lower Ranks  
4th month Interviews Lower Ranks  
  Observation Lower Ranks  
Graph 4.1 Research design 
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were especially helpful. We took pictures and they showed me around the border, con-
nected me to the refugee registration centre as well as to South Sudanese immigration 
officers for additional observation. To analyse bureaucratic settings I included sketches of 
offices and their interior. During my observations, I was certain that I was a source of irrita-
tion in bureaucratic settings.32 I realised that my presence often caused surprise for those 
who entered the offices. In case of clients, officers did not provide any explanation about 
my presence, and their astonishment might have continued throughout the whole encoun-
ters. As the occasions for systematic observations were few, I took advantage of any op-
portunity and added observations of office settings and work practices for example during 
interviews.  
Qualitative interviews were conducted to reflect multiple emic perspectives on immigration 
and immigration law enforcement. Interviews were conducted with various state agents on 
the one hand, and inner-African migrants on the other hand. To reflect on perspectives of 
immigrants, two case studies were conducted through narrative interviews. My two inform-
ants were young men who immigrated in 2012, both coming from countries that do not share 
a border with Uganda. What distinguishes both cases are origin and status. One case is an 
asylum seeker from the Horn of Africa now working in the city of Gulu. He immigrated to 
Uganda by crossing the border from Kenya unregistered. The other case is an immigrant 
from West Africa who trades goods in Northern Uganda with a tourist visa that he has to 
renew every three months. The interviews concerned the informants’ own experiences and 
cases of other immigrants concerning immigration law enforcement, as well as the handling 
of documents.  
The access to these respondents was uncomplicated. We had shared experiences with 
state officials together (in situations that resemble the prologue of this thesis), and had be-
come friends. I doubt that I would have been given the same answers without these shared 
experiences. I believe that they had created a high level of trust, so that we could talk about 
sensitive topics, for example informal practices, illegality, cheating, bribes and corruption. 
Immigrants and especially asylum seekers33 have to be treated as ‘vulnerable’ groups when 
it comes to research. I tried to “minimize harm” that their statements could mean for them 
(Bilger & van Liempt 2009: 3). Therefore the interviews were located in private places where 
we were undisturbed and where we could not be overheard. A recorder was used but I                                                            
32
 Other researchers also reflect on being a source of irritation in bureaucratic settings, for example 
in case of police stations (for Germany see Reichertz 1992; for West Africa see Beek & Göpfert 
2011).  
33
 Any statement which contradicts with asylum seekers’ earlier statements in official interviews can 
mean the end of their application for a refugee status, if it becomes public. 
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transcribed the interviews in an anonymized form directly afterwards so that I could imme-
diately delete the audio files. In case of narrations from the field I consistently use fake 
names in this thesis. Beside these case studies, additional experiences were reported to 
me in informal conversations with further informants. Even back in Germany, I received 
further news concerning mutual friends, for example about the arrest of an Ethiopian asylum 
seeker, or about the deportation of a Nigerian immigrant. 
Interviews with state agents were conducted with various stakeholders. The respondents 
had to be approached with formality. Most of the times, the demonstration of an official 
introduction letter from the University was necessary. Altogether, everyone agreed to par-
ticipate in my research, and overall people were very cooperative and friendly during the 
interviews. Sometimes I asked myself why the access to these state agents worked out so 
well.  Here, I began to ask myself if it would have been the same if I had been a person of 
colour. There were several (awkward) situations where I (as the only Mzungu) found myself 
being pulled out from behind of a row of people, all waiting in front of an office. Another 
factor that had an impact on the access to the field might have been my age and gender. 
My interview partners were men (with only one exception), most of them much older than 
me. Some of their responses gave me the impression that they believed me to be inexperi-
enced, naïve, but not a person to be suspicious of. Most of the interviews were conducted 
during office hours inside a person’s office. This led to many interruptions, because most of 
the time, we were not alone but accompanied by others who at times joined the interview. 
In some cases I had the impression that an officer had no duties at all, and was happy about 
the distraction my appearance brought in. 
The access to state agents was established along hierarchic structures that were already 
described as part of the law level. In Graph 4.2 I use the terms higher ranks and lower ranks 
to reflect on hierarchies. The terms only partially correlate with actual ranks but rather illus-
trate the difference between high rank representatives, chiefs and commissioners, com-
pared to officers who enforce the law directly in interaction with immigrants. Starting with 
higher ranks, the first people I approached belong to the government of Gulu district: the 
LC5 (who I got connected to because he was a former student of the IPSS) and the RDC 
(who I contacted formally in her office hours). From here I could make use of the snowball 
method.34 They connected me to other stakeholders: regional and district representatives 
of state security institutions: Internal Security, the UPDF and the UPF. During the research                                                            
34
 As they are part of an elite, high rank state agents are best accessed by snowball methods and 
through gatekeepers (Harvey 2010: 196 ff.). In one case I used the second strategy. Through a 
secretary of the RPC I was able to conduct interviews on the regional level of the UPF. 
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it was always helpful to mention the positions of my previous interview partners when intro-
ducing my research project to informants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews followed guidelines which were treated in a flexible manner. The duration varied 
from twenty to forty minutes. Questions mostly referred to a person’s office in terms of (im-
migration) law enforcement and evaluation concerning immigration. Like in other studies on 
elites and people of high ranks, the answers were often representative “rather than their 
own individual viewpoints” (Harvey 2010: 199). At the end of the interviews I asked my 
informants who the main stakeholders were that dealt with immigrants directly. The answers 
brought me to officers of lower ranks, working for the immigration and for the CIID of the 
police. 
These lower rank officers correlate with street-level bureaucrats as they enforce law in direct 
interactions with immigrants on a daily basis. Therefore, these agents became my main 
informants.35 I concentrated on four officers who belonged to different departments. In case 
of the police one officer worked in Crime Intelligence, and the other in Criminal Investigation. 
In case of the immigration officers, one worked in the regional headquarters in Gulu, while 
the other worked at the border post in Elegu. I already knew the police officers from previous 
experience with immigrants, and they connected me to the immigration officers. The inter-
view guideline was altered from the one that I used for the higher ranks. It included further 
questions about work practices, routines, previous experiences and categorization of immi-
grants. The interviews were intensive and took much longer than the ones with higher ranks. 
I met two informants several times at which occasions we had time for informal conversa-
tions. Their answers were much more personal compared to the higher ranks, and they                                                            
35
 Categorizing these officers as main informants did not only derive from my own ideas. One immi-
gration officer even introduced himself as my main informant. After I told him my research topic, he 
told me that he did not know who could help me more than he himself to get relevant information (“I 
know everything”).  
   
  INFORMANTS INSTITUTION 
HIGHER 
RANKS 
 
 
 
 
 
LC5 
RDC 
DISO 
PRO 
RPC 
Administrator 
DPC 
Local Government 
Central Government 
District Internal Security 
District UPDF 
Regional Police 
Regional Police 
District Police 
LOWER Officer Mark Immigration > Regional Office 
RANKS Officer John Immigration > Border Post 
  
Officer Samuel 
Officer Noah 
District Police > Crime Intelligence 
District Police > Criminal Investigation 
Graph 4.2 List of respondents and institutions 
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sometimes addressed informal practices of their work. Therefore, I decided to anonymize 
the lower rank officers and use fake names in this thesis.  
All of my informants spoke English so that I did not have to make use of an interpreter for 
the interviews. Language was also not a problem during my observations, because officers 
spoke English during work and with each other. My informants came from various districts, 
belonged to all kinds of ethnic groups of Uganda and therefore spoke different languages 
apart from English. I was told that in Uganda, police officers are not allowed to work in the 
districts where they came from. Everywhere in the country, all ethnic groups should be rep-
resented in the UPF. Police and immigration officers often shift between various districts 
and regions during their careers, and often leave their families behind. Many of my inform-
ants only recently moved to Gulu (or Elegu). The population of Gulu mainly consists of 
Acholi but only few officials from the higher level (and none of my informants from the lower 
level) are Acholi. They presented themselves instead as Iteso, Buganda or West Nilers.  
With only one exception (a denial without explanation) I was allowed to use a record ma-
chine during the interviews. Still, some encounters worked out very differently to how I had 
planned them. These experiences correlate with issues of “studying up” (Nader 1972), 
where respondents “often try to dictate conditions of an interview” (Harvey 2010: 200). 
When I explained my research interests to one informant with an especially high rank he 
suddenly started a long monologue about immigration to Northern Uganda. Eventually I 
found out that this was the interview already, but that I was not supposed to ask questions. 
Another high rank officer of older age simply took the guideline paper out of my hands, and 
only answered those questions that he wanted to. Again, I was not supposed to ask him 
questions and to guide the interview. In both cases, there was no time for me to ask for 
recording and I only took notes. Another time when I asked a question to a lower rank officer 
he turned the question back to me and told me to answer instead (“What have you 
learned?”), and that he would add further aspects (“I tell you what you’ve missed”). First I 
thought these interviews were total failures, because they differed so much from what I had 
learned about ethnographic interviews. But then, I found that all this was still data. Ideal 
interviewing as I had learned it, might have derived from a fairly different constellation of 
power that belongs to classical anthropology, which often focused on the ‘poor’ and the 
‘marginalized’. Flexibility was crucial to adapt to the local circumstances in Uganda. Some-
times interviews became stages to show off bureaucratic power, and documents like pass-
ports were involved in this presentation. As it was presented in the beginning of this chapter, 
the officer’s legal empowerment to ask for identification was used as a resource for his 
demonstration of bureaucratic power towards me, marking the opening of the interview.  
This study focuses on practices of immigration law enforcement including work routines. 
Information about routines is not always available through interviews. Routines partially 
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consist of embodied skills. They are characterized as implicit knowledge, often remain un-
questioned and “taken for granted” (Garfinkel 1967: 35). Therefore, routinized practices 
cannot easily be explicated in interviews, and observation becomes a crucial approach. 
Nevertheless, practices can be analysed in interviews and in informal conversations as well, 
if the respondent’s body language is included in the analysis. My respondents very often 
illustrated bureaucratic work with gestures that imitate stamping, or thumbing through a 
passport. Here, oral explanations alone did not suffice to describe practices. Sometimes the 
illustration was even supported by passports, files and other documents that were brought 
into the interview situation. Thereby, my respondents marked them as major components 
of immigration law enforcement practices. This study adapts this component and focuses 
on the documents that accompany the officers’ practices, as well as the material setting 
where the practices are located: “involving furniture, décor, physical layout, and other back-
ground items which supply the scenery and stage props for the spate of human action 
played out before, within or upon them” (Goffman 1959: 22). 
  
27 
 
5. Passport Practices 
The following chapters concentrate on immigration law enforcement on the street-level. In 
contrast to the law level that describes the official legal and institutional framework, the 
street-level concentrates on actual work practices. These are not mechanical applications 
of rules and laws. Instead, “[t]he exercise of discretion is a critical feature of decisionmaking 
in legal contexts” (Gilboy 1991: 571). It depends on the situation and on the setting if a 
pattern-following behaviour or discretion is more relevant. These tendencies will be ana-
lysed during the following chapters.  
Immigration law enforcement requires the combination of territorial borders with internal 
boundaries.36 In Uganda, it is structured into two domains: On Entry Management (at the 
border and the international airport in Entebbe) and Post Entry Management (inside the 
country). My main respondents have work experience in both domains, because they were 
deployed at the border as well as in internal offices. In both areas, passports play a central 
role. Officers at the border as well as inside the country make use of them. They are situa-
tional bounded instruments of identification as they always have to be compared with an 
individual in presence (Scheffer 1997: 196). Passports are flexible enough to adapt to vari-
ous situations, and as boundary objects they satisfy informational requirements of each 
(Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 393). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
36
 For a differentiation of territorial borders and social constructed boundaries see Fassin (2011).  
Picture 5.1 President Museveni launches the National Identity Card project 
(Source: JLOS Bulletin 002 [2011], p. 13.) 
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Documents of identification have recently started to gain more importance in Uganda (as 
shown Picture 5.1 and 5.2). The National Security Information System was launched in 
2013 and scheduled that registration and the possession of a national identification docu-
ment become mandatory.37 The mass enrolment started in 2014 as a preparation that only 
ID holders can participate at the presidential election in 2016. The Minister of Internal Affairs 
stated that in 2017 no child will be allowed to attend school without an ID.38 Additionally, the 
Minister stated that the replacement of older machine-readable passports by e-passports in 
2015 will “bolster internal security”.39 
 
 
   
                                                           
37
 Daily Monitor (2015): Register for national IDs or miss salaries, govt tells civil servants. 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Register-for-national-IDs-or-miss-salaries--govt/-/688334/ 
2588400/-/fj8sehz/-/index.html (accessed May 05, 2016). 
38
 New Vision (2015): No national ID, no school in 2017. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vi-
sion/news/ 132 2393/ national-id-school-2017 (accessed May 05, 2016). 
39
 “The e-passport is the same as a regular passport with the addition of a small contact-less inte-
grated circuit (computer chip) embedded in the back cover. The chip securely stores the same data 
visually displayed on the photo page of the passport, and additionally includes a digital photograph. 
It can also include medical, traffic, financial and other information” (New Vision [2014]: E-passports 
start 2015. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1312235/-passports-start-2015 [accessed 
May 05, 2016]). 
Picture 5.2 Immigration officers lifting passports at the 2012 Independence Day 
Parade (Source: http://www.facebook.com/ImmigrationUganda [accessed May 
07, 2016]) 
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5.1 On Entry Management 
The border is having these challenges. You don’t have any barrier properly erected 
and you don’t have any mechanism to identify whether this is a Ugandan or the other 
one. Unless you look at the documents. (Police Officer Samuel) 
This subchapter deals with law enforcement practices at the Ugandan border. The border 
setting is described and also the challenges that officers face regarding their work. The 
main task of immigration law enforcement is controlling people that want to cross the border. 
As the officer states in the quote above, passports and documents are central for this task. 
Passport control as the major practice of On Entry Management is analysed here.  
Nowadays, borders are gaining significance. This can be seen in Europe, where border 
controls are reinstalled and intensified in context of refugee movements. But it is also de-
scribed as an international phenomenon due to securitization processes since 9/11 (Fey-
issa & Hoehne 2010: 8; Fassin 2011: 215). In Uganda, border surveillance is a prevailing 
matter in security debates. In 2015, the UPF recruited additional personnel for Northern 
Uganda in order to “strengthen the number of Police force in the region, especially in the 
areas bordering South Sudan”.40  
Ugandan national borders have colonial origin and can therefore be termed as artificial con-
structs. Nevertheless, they might become “’real’ only as long as they are […] accepted 
through social practice” (Migdal & Schlichte 2005: 28). The contemporary management of 
borders as a major security agenda demonstrates that (at least in the perspective of state 
security agents) borderlines are not questioned at all, but rather defended and underpinned 
in their existence, for example by immigration law enforcement practices in border settings. 
But even if Ugandan state agents do not question the border and the border line, others still 
might do. Recently, this led to several conflicts in Northern Uganda. During the national 
census in 2014, Ugandan census officials and the LC5 chairman were arrested by the South 
Sudanese police in Moyo, an area that is claimed by both countries. As a protest “the resi-
dents locked the border with a chain and barricaded it with a log.”41 In Lamwo in August 
2015, there was a fire exchange between the UPDF and illegal South Sudanese settlers. 
“The district chairperson said people do not accept the GPS system saying it has been 
                                                           
40
 Jimmy Patrick Okema (Aswa River Regional Police Spokesperson), quoted by Acholi Times 
(January 05, 2015): New Police recruitment drive to seal porous border points in the North. 
41
 Daily Monitor (2014): South Sudanese attacked in Moyo protest. http://www.monitor.co.ug/ 
News/National/S--Sudanese-attacked-in-Moyo-protest/-/688334/2453732/-/yashoa/-/index.html (ac-
cessed May 05, 2016). 
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corrupted by Uganda to read wrong border points”.42 And in the case of the border area 
around Nimule and Elegu, it is stated that “the border remains a source of permanent low-
level conflict that does not necessarily end in killings, but infuses everyday life with a per-
manent threat” (Schomerus & Titeca 2012: 6). 
    
5.1.1 The Border Setting 
This subchapter describes the setting where On Entry Management is conducted. Elegu is 
one of only three border posts on the trade routes between Uganda and South Sudan. Here, 
the Great North Road crosses the border. Elegu is a small border town next to the South 
Sudanese city of Nimule. It only became an official border post a few years ago. Before, the 
Ugandan border post was located further inside the country in Bibia.43 
The road from Gulu to Elegu passes smaller towns, like the former IDP camps 
Pabbo and Atiak. Other sections of the road are plain and wide lands. Our bus 
passes road construction sites. Suddenly the asphalt stops and the road turns bad: 
rough, partly muddy but most of all dusty. We stop in Elegu. The place is busy. I find 
wooden shacks that stand cramped in multiple lines next to the roadside. Young 
men are seated there, paper and notes of South Sudanese money in front of them 
to exchange. It looks rather improvised. Between the shacks, a few uniformed police 
men sit on plastic chairs. In front of them lies an iron chain on the dusty ground 
across the street, to stop vehicles as I imagine. I see a sign that indicates animal 
inspection. Plastic waste lies on the roadside. I look around and I am confused. Even 
if there is only one road I cannot spot a marked border, any barrier, gate or landmark. 
I have to ask someone to show me where to find the immigration office.  
Madi and Acholi live on both sides of the border around Elegu. State workers on the other 
hand come from different areas and belong to different ethnic groups. I meet Dinka immi-
gration officers from South Sudan, and on the Ugandan side of the border I am surprised to 
meet many Buganda and even eat Matooke44 in a restaurant.  
Later I accompany immigration officer John with the office’s car across the border. It turns 
out that the crossing of the border is not just stepping over a line from one country to an-
other, but is rather a process where we pass by various actors and institutions involved in 
immigration management.   
                                                           
42
 New Vision (2015): South Sudanese withdraw from Uganda territory after skirmish. 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1331928/south-sudanese-withdraw-uganda-territory-
skirmish (accessed May 05, 2016). 
43
 During the conflict in Northern Uganda and even before, the border to Sudan remained almost 
unpatrolled so that the LRA was able to operate across the border, and was hiding in the border 
area (see Leopold 2009). 
44
 A dish made from plantains that is mostly served in Central and Southern Uganda but not com-
mon in the North.  
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Shortly behind the Ugandan immigration office the shacks and buildings stop. A little 
bit further I spot a small building with a veranda. There are some flags hissed on 
high poles, one is from the UNHCR. Many people, mostly women and children, sit 
on the ground in the shade of the building, others stay around a white tent. There 
are a few transporters loaded with baggage, plastic chairs and even mattresses. On 
the veranda is a desk where two people are seated. On the tables lie piles of lists 
and some registration books.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This place is Elegu’s refugee registration centre (shown in Picture 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2). The 
bureaucratic registration of refugees is described as “a process of stereotyping which in-
volves disaggregation, standardization, and the formulation of clear cut categories” (Zetter 
1991: 44). In practice, refugee categories are often less clear, for example the categorisa-
tion between self-settled refugees and those staying in official settlements. Some refugees 
will register for the official settlements to receive food rations, but nevertheless settle outside 
the camps (Singh 2005: 250). At the border of Elegu, refugees are separated from other 
immigrants that register in the immigration office (shown in Picture 5.1.1.4). The two bu-
reaucrats sitting here belong to the OPM, but tell me that also UNHCR and NGOs like Save 
the Children and the Red Cross are involved. The registration personnel tells me that all the 
people here do not have any kind of identification document. They line up to get registered. 
There are two lists: one registration sheet in general where name, number of household, 
Picture 5.1.1.1 Outside the refugee registration centre (12/2014) 
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age and ethnic group45 are written down. The other list registers if a person has special 
needs (for example in case of a pregnancy) and will receive a temporary PSN card. After 
the first registration the refugees wait until they are transferred to a reception centre in Nyu-
manzi where everyone is given an identification card. Later they are relocated to rural refu-
gee settlements, for example Ayilo II and Mungula settlements in Adjumani.46 Here, they 
receive food rations, household items and items for shelter construction. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behind the refugee compound follows “no man’s land”. Officer John explains to me 
that some people used to build houses here, but they were destroyed by the state as 
no one was allowed to live here. We pass a bridge across a small river. A sign with 
an arrow indicates that we have to change the side of the road.47 Behind the river we 
enter Nimule. Here, the roads are in good condition. We pass South Sudanese po-
licemen or soldiers that wave us through as soon as they spot John wearing his uni-
form. Trucks park in front of customs. We pass by a stone building where “Immigra-
tion” is written on its well-preserved façade.  
 
                                                            
45
 By the end of 2014 the Madi were the main ethnic group registering as refugees in the centre of 
Elegu. Rumours indicated that the war in South Sudan was now turning against the Madi popula-
tion around Nimule. Because of the rumours many took flight to Northern Uganda at the time of my 
observation.  46 UNHCR [2014]: Uganda Emergency Update, pp. 3 ff. 
47
 In Uganda traffic drives left while in South Sudan it drives on the right side. 
Picture 5.1.1.2 South Sudanese refugees are getting registered (12/2014) 
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The total border length between Uganda and South Sudan is about 435 kilometres. The 
map shows many parts of it as straight lines. But around Elegu and Nimule it changes to a 
more ‘natural’ line that is oriented towards the small river Unyama.48 In contrast to Elegu, 
Nimule has been holding a border post for long and has developed a good infrastructure. I 
am told that Ugandan and South Sudanese immigration officers communicate and ex-
change information on a daily basis. This becomes visible when we arrive back at the Ugan-
dan immigration office. 
A colleague tells Officer John that a South Sudanese immigration officer had come 
to his office. He had asked him to send back the Madi refugees, as there was no 
real threat for them in Nimule but only rumours. The colleague asks John: “What do 
we do with them?” 
Afterwards, John tells his colleague that their office is not responsible for refugees and can-
not do anything. On the law level, the responsibility for handling refugees is transferred to 
different institutions than to those dealing with other categories of immigrants. Nevertheless, 
on the street-level the assignment is not happening automatically. Sometimes (like in the 
                                                           48 Originally, the colonial border was roughly defined as a straight line by the British. This changed 
after the death of King Leopold in 1909 when a part of the former Belgian Congo was transferred to 
Britain. A British commission was then sent to define a new and more precise borderline between 
Sudan and Uganda. Some areas were not accessed easily and remained straight lines on the map. 
But around Nimule, the commission worked out a twisting line following the river (Blake 1997). 
Picture 5.1.1.3 People crossing the “no man’s land” (12/2014) 
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case of John’s colleague) uncertainty is involved. Another example of sorting out responsi-
bilities is given by Officer John during the interview: “Sometimes people come and claim 
that they are refugees, and yet they are not. So it becomes a bit of a challenge. Like you 
have to call UNHCR for them to be able to identify the responsibilities.” 
The immigration officers that I meet in Elegu tell me that their daily work load (all people 
crossing the border and getting registered apart from refugees) encompasses eight to fif-
teen buses. Most of them arrive in the morning and by that time the place is busy. Therefore, 
there is a wooden roof on poles in front of the Ugandan immigration office to protect the 
waiting queue from the sunshine. Here, people are supposed to line up if they want to get 
access to the office. There is a small table at the end of the roof where one or two workers 
assist to fill out forms. Officer John tells me that this is necessary because people are not 
always able to read or write. Next to the table is the entrance to the immigration office.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 5.1.1.4 Outside the immigration office in Elegu (12/2014) 
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The office is separated by a wooden barrier that isolates clients against the bureaucrats 
(Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 117 f.). The barrier has two windows through which the people stand-
ing in line can see immigration officers that are seated behind. Again, the people are sup-
posed to line up in front of each occupied window. The office setting thereby “provide[s] an 
orderly way of bringing the public and the officials of the agency together” (Zimmerman 
1966: 323). The officers are wearing white immigration uniforms which are obligatory at the 
border. The uniform marks the officers as state agents that represent the Ugandan state. 
This is reinforced by the president’s portrait hanging behind them (as shown in Picture 
5.1.1.5). They are seated on elevated chairs so that they look down at the people approach-
ing them. These can only spot the upper part of their body, while the officers can oversee 
the whole room. On a small desk is a scanner for fingerprints. The person standing in front 
of the wall is facing a camera. The window has a small area without glass. This is the only 
spot in the setting where physical contact between officer and client is possible. This space 
is used for the passport to be handed over. This office environment “conditions the way 
[officers] perceive problems and frame solutions to them. The work environment of street-
level bureaucrats is structured by common conditions that give rise to common patterns of 
practice” (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 27), like the common practice of passport controls in the case 
of a border post setting. 
Picture 5.1.1.5 ‘Frontstage’ of the border post (12/2014) 
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Only the entrance and the front of the immigration desks are meant for public access. The 
other side of the wall (shown in Picture 5.1.1.6) can only be reached by the officers through 
a covered and closed door.49 Behind I see the high bar-stools, small desks with stamps, 
documents, the passport reading machine and the computer, but apart from these official 
utensils there are also sodas, food and newspapers lying around. Across the room a small 
television is installed that shows music videos and can be watched from this position. The 
space behind the barrier which cannot be spotted by the public is rather messy. This is the 
‘backstage’ of the immigration office. Another ‘backstage’ is found in a small back room. 
The public is not supposed to en-
ter here, where documents are 
kept and the generator is installed. 
A ‘backstage’ stores equipment 
needed for presentations on the 
‘frontstage’, it can be used “pri-
vately” because here, “the person 
can relax; he drops his front, forgo 
speaking his lines and steps out of 
character” (Goffman 1959: 112). 
Behind this room there is a back-
yard with little apartments and a 
shared lavatory. This space 
serves as private space for the of-
ficers. As described here, the spa-
tial distinction between public front 
and private backstage is shaped 
and partially controlled by the 
structure of the setting.50  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
49
 Closed doors are an essential part of law enforcing institutions, like the police (Beek 2012).  
50
 In the case of police stations, the same dichotomized character is described between a public 
front and a private back-region. “Here, police control space free from the ears and eyes of mem-
bers of the public” (Holdaway 1980: 84).  
Picture 5.1.1.6 ‘Backstage’ of the border post (12/2014) 
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During the interviews my respondents name several challenges for immigration law en-
forcement that derive from the border setting. The main point concerns border porosity. 
Officially, the immigration border post in Elegu is an “obligatory passage point” (Callon 
1986) for people who want to cross the border. The immigration officers can be described 
as gate-keepers. Nevertheless, in practice the passage point is often bypassed, for example 
by one of my informants: “I didn’t register on the border. I just hide when I enter to Uganda. 
You know, when I was with the driver? I give the driver some small money. Then I told him, 
Sir, I don’t like to see me this people. Because they can record you” (Immigrant, anony-
mous).  Apart from a few border posts the borderline is unmonitored. Many prefer to choose 
informal ways to cross the border. “These bodaboda motorcycles they smuggle people. 
They smuggle all, everything. Goods, people, anything. And yet, for them they reach eve-
rywhere. They can use a foot path” (Immigration Officer John). “People have shortcuts. 
Where they prefer to use un-gazetted roads. We call them panya51 roads. Those illegal 
roads which are not gazetted” (Police Officer Samuel). The officers give different explana-
tions for this behaviour. People living in the border area have family members living on the 
other side of the border, which they want to visit without bureaucratic formality. Others might 
want to avoid visa fees, while still others simply do not know that they are supposed to get 
registered: 
Most of them they are travelling for the first time. They don’t even have passports. 
They bypass their own office when they come. And you have to explain to the per-
son, for him to be able to understand that he or she needs a travel document from 
his own country. (Immigration Officer John)  
My informants from the border post state that they lack resources to successfully practice 
immigration law enforcement, especially when it comes to manpower. “The border is po-
rous. A little bit stretched. So you have to be in all places at the same time. But me, I cannot 
be there” (Immigration Officer John).   
                                                           
51 Panya is translated ‘rat’ in Kiswahili, while ‘panya roads’ mean unofficial roads and shortcuts.  
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5.1.2 Passport Control as Categorization Work 
Wherever you go any immigration officer will just tell you. They hold your passport 
like this. [He leans back and stretches one hand in front of his body. The other hand 
imitates the flipping of an imaginary passport‘s pages.] Oh, you are a Nigerian? Then 
they say: Ok, hold on. Wait here. [He points next to himself.] You know? Because 
you can’t finish a Nigerian in the five minutes you have given him. You need to look 
at him through your glasses. Look carefully. Use the machine also. Use the pass-
port. Before you make a decision. So you need to be very careful. (Immigration Of-
ficer Michael)  
This quote contains some of the main constituents of passport control. The passport is the 
central element of the situation. It is supported by technologies like computers and passport 
reading machines. For the officers, controls are routinized work. Repetitive body move-
ments are involved. These are imitated during the interview. Through reading the passport52 
a person’s nationality is identified. At the next time the identification leads to categorization 
which is mainly based on previous knowledge. As it will be presented in this subchapter, 
nationality is commonly linked to certain categories of crime and security issues as part of 
immigration law enforcement. Therefore, passport control as the main practice of On Entry 
Management can be called ‘categorization work’.53 
The passport control begins when the client passes his or her passport through the hole of 
the window of the immigration desk. The immigration officer reads through the passport with 
a trained “administrative sight” (Scheffer 1997). Officers undergo trainings in how to handle 
passports correctly. During one interview I am told to look through the passport of a Kenyan 
immigrant and the officer gives me instructions (“Look at it. Open it. Open it again.”). The 
officers develop skills for this task. They adapt the sight to the movement of hands, and 
switch between looking at the document and looking at the person. Their movements are 
fast and they rapidly gather relevant information from the document.  
As I flip through here, like this, I am talking to you. (One of his hand is holding the 
passport while the fingers of the other hand are flipping through the document. Sim-
ultaneously he takes a look at the pages but glances at me again and again without 
moving his head but only his eyes.) I will be looking to you, and talking to you, and 
look at it, and talking to you, and look. So at the end of this journey through the 
passport I will have known where he has been to, when and how. (Immigration Of-
ficer Michael) 
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 The control of travel documents is the main issue in the immigration office in Elegu. There are of 
course different types of travel documents, for example temporary travel documents. Nevertheless, 
the descriptions in this chapter overall focus on passports.  
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 This refers to Bowker and Leigh-Star who state that the creation and maintenance of categories 
overall is a “work practice” (Bowker & Leigh Star 1999: 5). 
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Passports as “immutable mobiles” are designed to be readable, flat, mobile, and consistent 
(Latour 2006). Here, the passport is treated as a source of knowledge about a person’s 
nationality and status (of being a refugee, resident, prohibited or illegal immigrant). Immi-
gration officers in Uganda are also trained in document detection. Here, the materiality of 
the passport comes into focus. The officers develop a keen sense for the material which 
goes beyond everybody. Officer Michael states: “You will not know if one page was teared 
out before. You will flip on. But the immigration will know.” 
Passport control is labour intensive (Gilboy 1991: 579). During the control the passport is 
combined with other tools. All this is done in a fixed order. The immigration officer follows 
the same steps in each encounter. On Entry Management is characterized mainly by this 
routine work: “Your passport please, can I look here, stand this camera. Do this, do that, do 
this” (Immigration Officer Michael). The passport is placed on the passport reading machine. 
The document that was filled at the entrance is handed over to the officer. Photographs and 
fingerprints are taken, both techniques that are “reading off the body” (Torpey 2000: 17).54 
The officer checks information about a person which is saved in a computer system. The 
system checks if the passport number and a person’s fingerprints are consistent. The offic-
ers at the border tell me that this is very useful as sometimes the identification of a person 
by the passport picture alone is not sufficient. 
It is normally with the Somalis because their faces are almost the same. So some-
times, if you don’t take their fingerprints it can be hard for you. […] If the fingerprints 
don’t match the ones which are stored in the computer it will bring a message. Then 
we know that this person is holding another person’s document. (Immigration Officer 
John) 
The bureaucrat’s administrative vision is culturally practiced and always limited. Therefore, 
Scheffer calls the inability to recognise faces that bureaucrats are not familiar with a “sight 
disorder” (Scheffer 1997: 190). Without the computer warning the officer stamps the pass-
port and beckons the next person over. In case of inconsistency, a red warning sign saying 
“invalid” is shown on the whole computer screen. This can only be seen by the officer but 
not by the person standing in front of the desk. The setting provides an “informal preserve” 
for the officers behind the barrier that controls the access of information (Goffman 1971:    
63 f.).  
 
                                                           
54
 This contrasts identification techniques of “writing on the body” like branding, scarification and 
tattooing. Nowadays, the passport is said to have replaced these techniques to the greatest extent 
on the state level (Torpey 2000: 17).  
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But even with the check-up through the computer, the immigration officer him- or herself 
must constantly doubt the authenticity of the passport and the identity of a person, because 
often “the organizational intelligence system provides incomplete, unreliable, or dated 
knowledge about certain travellers” (Gilboy 1991: 579). One officer states: “If you relax 
wrong ones will pass and they will cause trouble.” The term ‘wrong ones’ (as well as ‘wrong 
elements’) is an expression that many of my informants use to categorize criminals, smug-
glers or terrorists among immigrants. Their duty in terms of immigration law enforcement is 
to detect such ‘wrong elements’ and prevent them from entering Uganda. But at the same 
time the extensive control of every person is hindered by time pressure, as this is the case 
for every passport control at busy border posts (Heyman 1995: 272).  
You need to be sharp. Pay attention for quick decision making. You need a quick 
mind. Many people are there. You only have five minutes to flip through each pass-
port. Next, next. (He imitates a stamp by making a fist with his right hand, moving it 
twice towards the table.) In between, there is one smuggler carrying six kilogram of 
cocaine in the stomach. You have to look at the body language, look them in the 
eyes and make decisions immediately. Then my antennas (He points at his head.) 
come out. (Immigration Officer Michael) 
The officer’s ‘antennas’ indicate that intuition is another important aspect of On Entry Man-
agement apart from passports and computer systems. Another aspect is previous 
knowledge. What people believe to be true influences the categorization of people. This can 
happen in terms of security matters, as Janet Gilboy explains when immigration officers at 
an US airport categorize travellers by nationality into positive and negative categories (Gil-
boy 1991: 587). Such a categorization on the basis of nationality is described by my inform-
ants as well: “From all experiences and knowledge we can be able to grade you by your 
nationality” (Immigration Officer Michael). Grading people by nationality often implicates 
prejudice and stereotypes, for example: “Every time you get a Nigerian at least there has to 
be something wrong with him” (Immigration Officer Michael). “South Sudanese are the 
worst. They are very feasible. No emotions with no intellect like warriors. Somalis also. Like 
stabbing people with knives” (Police Officer Samuel). This ‘knowledge’ is not provided by 
the computer system but brought into the passport control by the officers themselves. 
Sometimes it can derive from an officer’s experience, but most of the times it is shared 
within the organisation and its members: “All this that I am telling you is not knowledge I 
came with, but it is knowledge I found here because of my office” (Immigration Officer Mi-
chael). The last aspects demonstrate that even if passports formally look equal, their owners 
are not equally treated during passport controls. Passports might contain the same legal 
status, but the nationality itself often leads to different treatments by state officials.  
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5.2 Post Entry Management 
We hope that in the near future we should be able to improve on our Post Entry                    
Management. Because we can’t man all the borders (Immigration Officer Michael). 
The previous chapter mentions challenges that officers face concerning immigration law 
enforcement at the border setting. My informants describe border porosity as a threat for 
the security of Uganda. Recently, there has been a shift towards another strategy of immi-
gration law enforcement that deals with it inside the country: Post Entry Management. Post 
Entry Management is structured into two domains: “That is the facilitation and control of 
aliens who have entered Uganda” (Immigration Officer Michael). In Northern Uganda facil-
itation is done in the regional immigration office in Gulu while control is taking place mainly 
outside offices. Officers check “the right people and the right country, the right purpose, 
using the right passes. So that’s where you may find us. Check a few places, talk to a few 
people, moving, ask for a few documents here and there” (Immigration Officer Michael). 
This chapter is structured according to this organisation: first it deals with office work and 
afterwards it moves on to checks and controls outside the office’s setting.  
This analysis of Post Entry Management is concentrated on the city of Gulu. It is the city of 
Northern Uganda with the highest population, estimated to be around 370,000.55 Gulu is 
located about one hundred kilometres away from the border to South Sudan. The Great 
North Road passes through the city and public buses stop here along their way between 
Juba and Kampala. Because of the recent influx of trade towards South Sudan the city is 
labelled “border boomtown” (Yoshino et al. 2012 cited in Schomerus & Titeca 2012: 6).56 
Economic opportunities for locals as well as for immigrants arise, for example in the 
transport sector or in the hotel sector, accommodating travellers and traders. In addition to 
that, many refugees and asylum seekers choose to live in urban centres. Urban refugees 
and asylum seekers in Uganda come from the DRC, Somalia, Eritrea, Rwanda or Ethiopia, 
while refugees in rural settlements mainly come from Uganda’s neighbouring countries like 
South Sudan and the DRC (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 37). As by law they are allowed to 
work, many refugees stay in cities like Gulu where they are unassisted by the UNHCR, but 
free to start a business. As it was described in the chapter about the law level, refugee 
matters are transferred to specialised institutions. But in practice Uganda resembles many 
African states where “a refugee is treated like any other legally resident foreigner” (Ricca                                                            
55
 LC Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda (2011/12): Gulu District Council Score-
Card Report, p. 3. 
56
 During the conflict in Northern Uganda this was not the case. Due to insecurities around Gulu the 
city of Arua in West Nile was the major crossing point towards Sudan (Leopold 2009: 474). 
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1989: 145). This can be observed in the case of Post Entry Management in Gulu as it will 
be described in this thesis.  
 
5.2.1 Office-Work 
Weber describes the office (“Bureau”) as the central point for legal acting (Weber 1980 
[1922]: 126). The regional immigration office of Gulu is a small room (see Graph 5.2.1.1) in 
a side wing of an office building where several departments of the Ministry for Internal Affairs 
are seated. Two chairs stand in the hall for 
people to sit and wait before it is their turn to 
enter. There are two desks in the office. The 
one in front of the door belongs to the Princi-
ple Immigration Officer who is in charge of 
the whole region. He is seated in a mobile 
office chair. A small Ugandan flag stands on 
the table. It marks that this office belongs to 
the state. Batches of files and documents are 
spread over the table. On the other side of 
the room there is another desk with a com-
puter and even more files lying around. A 
lower rank immigration officer is sitting here. 
There are wooden chairs for clients standing 
in front of each desk.  
A young man enters the office. He shortly looks at me and seems a little confused 
about my presence. Officer Michael asks him to sit down in front of his desk. The 
man sits a bit distant from the table. During the encounter he seems a little nervous 
and restless. He does not take off his rucksack, sits straight on the edge of his chair 
while his arms are folded in front of his body. On the other side of the table the officer 
moves around on his mobile chair. He thumbs though the file of the young man while 
moving his arms far over the table when reaching for additional documents, the 
Constitution and office utensils. 
During this encounter different ‘territories’ for the participants of the situation are provided 
by the setting and claimed through practices (according to Goffman 1971). During the en-
counter, the ‘use space’ of Officer Michael refers to the whole table. His space is even 
extended through his mobile chair. On the other hand, the client is not able to make use of 
the table himself because the whole table is already occupied by the officer’s files and uten-
sils. His territory is restricted to the ‘personal space’ of his body and to the chair on which 
he is sitting. The young man reinforces this arrangement and does not even dare to put off 
Graph 5.2.1.1: Setting of the immigration       
office in Gulu 
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his rucksack. Here, spaces mark inequalities during the bureaucratic encounter: “[T]he 
higher the rank, the greater the size of all territories of the self” (ibid: 65).  
During my observation I get the notion that files follow a particular path through this office. 
The files on the desk of the Principle Immigration Officer are sorted into various piles: “Alien 
Files” on his right and “Citizen Files” (labelled “Gulu”) on his left. The files have notes stick-
ing on them where missing documents and missing information are listed, as well as tasks 
that have to be carried out. When the file is complete and tasks are carried out the Principle 
Immigration Officer removes the sticky notes. The files are passed on to the other desk 
where the information is typed into the computer system. Passports and other identification 
documents are often not physically present (unless they are to be sent to Kampala for visa 
extensions as this can only be done in the main headquarters). Instead, files contain their 
photocopies but these copies are not always trusted. Officer Samuel tells me how to cope 
with passports not present: “Normally you verify through the major computer we have. Com-
pare the code. They can be frauds, but there is a code which says it is from this file number 
this person has been given. Then we know it. That is how we identify.”   
Several challenges are formulated for immigration law enforcement in this setting. One is 
the shortage of manpower. In contrast to the official division of tasks of the Directorate of 
Citizenship and Immigration Control that was presented in the chapter about the law level, 
only few officers work at the regional office and have to handle all issues at the same time. 
“My job is from top to bottom, filling the gaps. This man does it all” (Immigration Officer 
Michael). The officers are responsible for citizens and passport issues, as well as for immi-
grants and their legal status. At the same time, the regional office coordinates most of the 
border posts in the North. Even if facilitation is the main task of the regional office, the 
officers still are responsible for law enforcement and control. This leads to doubts about the 
authenticity of documents and about the truth of clients’ statements. The officers tell me 
about several cases where clients made false statements. “So he comes down here and 
wishes to beat the system so that he can get a Ugandan travelling document and use it for 
illicit trade. So we get such people. Coming in here” (Immigration Officer Michael).  
The regional immigration office stores the contacts of the registered immigrants in Northern 
Uganda into the computer system. The system automatically picks the digitalized files of 
immigrants whose documents are soon going to expire. When documents are not renewed 
on time, the immigration officers are aware that a status has changed from legal to illegal. 
The system provides telephone numbers, work and residence addresses of registered mi-
grants. The officers regularly call the migrants that were picked by the system and order 
them to come to their office. “We request them to come physically” (Immigration Officer 
Michael). A pile on the desk of the Principle Immigration Officer consists of those cases and 
the officer calls one by one during my observation.  
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Officer Michael calls another number with his mobile phone. “How are you? (…) I 
am still waiting for you in the office. (…) You should come and declare here first.” 
He hangs up abruptly. Michael tells me that the person has an expired visa. “This 
one is running away. Heading towards Kampala.” 
During my observation only one person shows up in the office. An Indian man is begging 
the officers “Please tomorrow. My wife is sick.” Michael seems to be annoyed. “You are 
delaying again.” Finally the man is allowed to leave, but reminded to return the next day. 
A major challenge for Post Entry Management in regional immigration offices is that many 
immigrants do not come to the office at all. When I tell my friends who immigrated to Uganda 
that I am going to the immigration office in Gulu, they are surprised that such a place even 
exists. Only few had been registered in the regional office. For those that are in Gulu as 
refugees and asylum seekers “matters, even amidst local decentralization policy in Uganda, 
are highly centralized” (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 33). The responsible OPM does not pro-
vide regional offices. Therefore, asylum seekers have to travel to the office in Kampala to 
extend their papers every three months. The regional office for other immigrants in Gulu 
does not issue visas directly from here, but transfers documents towards the main head-
quarters. So even if immigrants are aware of the regional office, many still prefer to extend 
their visas directly in Kampala.  
 
5.2.2 Audit Checks 
Post Entry Management is often hindered when immigrants do not come to the regional 
offices at all. Those that were registered are called by the immigration officers when the 
computer system indicates that their status has changed: “I will ask them: You want to come 
to my office? Can you come now? Most of them already know why I am calling. If he doesn’t 
come I call Samuel and say: Please can you pick so and so. Bring them here” (Immigration 
Officer Michael). Officer Samuel works for the CIID of the police in Gulu. “Police officers, 
especially crime intelligence, they are the ones who do it. They can inform the authority, 
inform the immigration. They have right to arrest and hand over to immigration” (Police 
Officer Samuel). This part of immigration law enforcement happens outside of offices, and 
“this is where the police comes in” (DISO of Gulu).  
But only some immigrants are registered and can be located by an address through the 
computer system. The major challenge for immigration law enforcement is claimed to be 
immigrants that enter and stay without getting registered at all.  
In Gulu illegal immigrants, people who are unlawfully staying present in the district 
of Gulu are many. So challenges we have, they are there because they don’t want 
to come willingly, even to report their presence. Even when they know that their visa 
has expired. So we have to follow them. (Police Officer Samuel) 
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Unregistered immigrants are seen as a threat for the national security.57 Therefore, police 
officers check on foreigners and ask for passports on spec. The officers call this “audit 
checks”.  
We do audit checks. Whether in the hotel, whether in offices. We crack down on the 
immigrants. Any time. Maybe you have reasons to believe that some people are 
staying in a barrack. They are foreigners but we don’t know if they are good. That’s 
what we call audit checks. (Police Officer Samuel) 
Where do police officers undertake audit checks? There are certain “hot spots” where high 
numbers of inner-African immigrants can be found (Dijk 2011). “In a place foreigners do 
business, they come once in a while. They can take like five months, they will come and 
check people there and know if the papers are correct” (Immigrant, anonymous). In Gulu 
‘hot spots’ are for example restaurants, bars and guesthouses that are run by inner-African 
foreigners. These informal settings differ very much from offices and border posts which are 
structured for the encounter between immigrants and state agents. In contrast to border 
posts, police officers wear no uniforms during audit checks, to “appear to be a common 
person” (Police Officer Noah). Instead of wearing uniform, a document identifies the officer 
as belonging to a state institution. 
So you should first of all begin with humble questions. And of course you should be 
showing your card. Which gives you the privilege of a police officer. Warrant card, 
you see (He shows me a small card that he takes from the pocket of his shirt. War-
rant is written on it in capital letters. It shows the emblem of the Ugandan police and 
his picture.) It warrants me to do the work, without I cannot act. (Police Officer Sam-
uel) 
By regulations, showing this document is an essential part of passport control outside           
offices.  
One example of an audit check in an informal setting can be found in the prologue of this 
thesis, where police officers check passports in an Eritrean guesthouse. Other times, I rec-
ognise officers sitting in foreign-run hotel bars or restaurants, but I am not sure if this is an 
audit check and they are there for work, or if they pass their time here privately. One inform-
ant tells me later that he feels to be on a twenty-four hours duty, where “even if I am drinking                                                            
57
 During the interview with the LC5 he tells me that after the arrests of Al-Shabaab members in 
Uganda in 2014 the local governments were told by the central government to find out if foreigners 
in their districts were in Uganda illegally. He interprets this as a confusion of roles and responsibili-
ties between state actors: “I said what moral authority do I have as the local government? So first 
of all how do I start? Which part of the law would I use? Of course we have to monitor. But I can 
only monitor when you are involved with organisations. I cannot find you on the street and begin 
asking you. That is going to be purely at the institutional level. But if I begin following you and all 
that, that is not my role. So that is probably the role of the police.”  
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I am doing my work” (Police Officer Noah). A clear distinction between private and official 
is blurred. One time I am present during an audit check when two police officers enter the 
guesthouse where I am staying. 
 
I am in my room when I hear loud voices from the reception area. One of the voices 
sounds familiar. The Ethiopian hotel manager Emma calls out my room neighbour 
from Kenya. After some minutes I see the Kenyan coming back from the reception. 
Now Emma calls my name. I enter the reception room. Two men are sitting in front 
of Emma’s reception desk. I recognize one of them immediately. It’s the inspector 
that I met at the CPS during Bless’ arrest. He looks surprised to meet me again. We 
greet each other. Again he is not wearing uniform. The officer first of all asks me to 
present my passport to the other man who is also a police officer. He then asks me 
if I know the Kenyan customer. I tell him that he is attached to Gulu University. Then 
the inspector passes a black and white photocopy to me. “Do you know this paper?” 
I look at it, and read “asylum”. There is a passport picture which is hard to identify. 
Then I realise that the document refers to Emma, the hotel manager. The inspector 
points at the expiry date: it expired almost two months ago. He takes back the doc-
ument. Emma says: “Please forgive me Sir, this time.” The inspector rejects and 
tells us that a period of two months is too long to forgive: “It is a state issue now.” 
He says to his colleague: “We should take him at least for one night. We get a car 
and we go.” Emma and I know that this means detention, and because of Bless we 
know what the detention cells are like. I am asked to go back to my room where I 
wait anxiously.  
During my wait I try to make sense of the voices I hear from the reception. Other 
people are arriving to the scene. They are in the compound now. I see our Ugandan 
friend Joseph talking to the inspector in Luo while Emma is running up and down 
talking Tigrinya on the phone. Later the place is quiet again. I enter the reception 
and I am relieved to see Emma sitting behind his desk. The police officers are gone. 
The whole evening we sit together and talk about what has happened together with 
the Kenyan customer and Joseph. But despite all kinds of explanations I can’t stop 
being confused about what has happened and what has made the police men 
change their minds. The next day Emma tells me during breakfast that while the 
inspector was talking to Joseph outside the reception, Emma secretly gave fifty thou-
sand Ugandan Shillings58 to the other officer. After that, both officers left the guest-
house.  
 
Audit checks are passport controls. Compared to the passport control at the border post 
this control is less routinized. Law enforcement practices outside offices are placed in com-
plex settings with a variety of actors. Here, decision-making of street-level bureaucrats is 
often ad-hoc, situational and intuitive (Bittner 1967: 712). With often no time and resources 
available for a careful evaluation of the situation in advance of their decisions-making, police 
officers frequently “worry […] about the law and organizational procedure afterwards” 
(Meehan 1986: 77). The outcome of this passport control seems less clear than at the bor-
der post. In the situation above, the immigrant gets off lightly. The outcome seems to par-
tially depend on negotiation skills. The access to the setting is not controlled and therefore                                                            
58
 Which equals 15 US Dollar. 
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other actors emerge at the scene, like a friend that speaks the same language as the in-
spector. These actors support the immigrant during the audit check. They guarantee the 
police that he is not a criminal and will get his papers done as soon as possible.  
Other times immigrants will not be as lucky and the outcome will be completely different. 
Officer Samuel tells me about the arrest of several Eritreans in an Ethiopian restaurant. 
They had entered Uganda without getting registered and were on their way towards Kam-
pala. Later, I am told by the workers of the restaurant that the driver of their vehicle (probably 
their trafficker) was arrogant and insulting towards the officers which led to the arrests. Re-
searchers highlight the significance of discretion for police work. Rules must be enforced 
selectively, because the police cannot arrest everybody who is committing an offence 
(Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 14). Law enforcement therefore is not controllable by laws and regu-
lations alone. Street-level bureaucrats “are not passively obeying orders; they are also 
moral agents” (Fassin 2011: 218).59 In the case of immigration law enforcement Officer 
Noah states: “Is it the first time he is committing or she is committing the offence, we forgive. 
And we process the documents. If not, we deport.” 
Again, passport control involves categorization work. But in case of Post Entry Management 
the implementation of categorization differs from the border post. It is obvious that apart 
from official entry and exit points officers cannot ask every person for his or her passport. 
They either concentrate on ‘hot spots’ where they expect immigrants to be. In addition to 
that, categorization may occur even before the passport is checked. Through prior catego-
rization, officers make a selection of people that they expect to be foreigners. Some immi-
grants are more often affected by audit checks than others due to their appearance, and for 
example due to gender perceptions.  
Actually, a foreign woman can live very freely here, more than a man. I don’t know 
why. I think because especially black women, I think they just look the same. 
Whether they are brown, too brown or dark and all that, nobody cares. (LC 5 of Gulu) 
Stereotyping is a general strategy for police patrols. “Young men in groups are suspicious, 
as are solitary women at night. This appears to be a specific feature not only of the Ugandan 
police, but a characteristic of police in general” (Biecker & Schlichte 2014: 27).  Especially 
relevant for immigration law enforcement are practices of racial profiling.  
The way they look. You will just know. They are extremely dark. They are tall. It is 
very easy to know that. You can identify them. Even in Gulu they are here. Even the                                                            
59
 In accordance with Heyman J. (2000): Respect for outsiders? Respect for the law? The moral 
evaluation of high-scale issues by US immigration officers. In: Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 6(4), pp. 635-652. 
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hand is dark. And they are culturally, generally, also naturally hostile people. (RPC 
of Aswa River Region about South Sudanese immigrants) 
One case demonstrates how categorization through racial profiling is related to security and 
terrorism discourses in Uganda: 
Back in Germany one of my friends calls me and tells me that he was arrested in 
Gulu. It was during the election campaigns when President Museveni came to North-
ern Uganda. My friend, an asylum seeker from Ethiopia, was on his way home when 
he suddenly got in the way of the President’s escort. He immediately was arrested. 
Because of his skin colour the security agents thought him to be a Somalian immi-
grant. They suspected him of belonging to Al-Shabaab and of having planned to 
attack the president. He had to stay in the detention cell for one night until he was 
released.  
It is reported that in Uganda illegal arrests often happen “under the guise of expressions 
like ‘reasons of state, hostile origin or association, acts prejudicial to public safety or defence 
of the state’ which have been mystified and likened to subversion and even terrorism” 
(Ngufor Forkum 2007: 51). In the case above, passport and documents are not involved in 
the categorization at all. Instead, a lighter skin colour alone is enough to categorize a person 
as a security threat and a terrorist.  
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6. Making of Passport Networks 
Cooperation between state agents is necessary for immigration law enforcement. The co-
operation between various state institutions is described in this chapter. Apart from that, 
informal cooperative relations between state agents and immigrants are analysed. In both 
cases, cooperation goes beyond simple encounters, single interactions and face-to-face 
situations which were described in the previous chapter. Actors establish more durable re-
lations: networks of cooperation that they can rely on for more than one encounter.  
The term ‘network’ is used, but it is not related to an analysis of sets of relations that indi-
viduals have. Instead of analysing established relations, this chapter is about the making of 
networks. The central questions are: how do actors establish networks, and how do they 
make use of them? Here, networks are analysed as practices. The term ‘networking’ will be 
used to emphasize this practical implication. It will be shown that networking often remains 
an attempt, and a reliable relation will sometimes not be established at all.  
Sometimes, passports are the main reason for an engagement. Again, documents, as well 
as other bureaucratic items and technologies are central elements. It will be shown that they 
often enable agents to establish networks in the first place.  
 
6.1 Institutional Networking 
A major reason for the establishment of networks between state security institutions is in-
telligence. This is also formulated in case of immigration law enforcement at the border: “I 
can specifically say that the borders of Uganda are intelligence led. We always share infor-
mation more than anything else” (PRO of the UPDF). According to the IOM, one of the main 
objectives of current migration policy of the Ugandan government is to enhance inter-
agency “cooperation at national, bilateral, regional and international [levels]”.60 Inter-agency 
cooperation on the local level in Northern Uganda is formulated by my respondents. “We 
do all this in coordination with other government agencies that we call stakeholders. Like 
the RDC office, DPC, Crime Intelligence, CID, the DISO office, district internal security or-
ganisation. We coordinate and work together” (Immigration Officer Michael). As it was pre-
sented above, the law level already provides certain platforms that structure the cooperation 
of these numerous state institutions. In District Security Committees representatives of dif-
ferent institutions come together to share information. Intelligence is further shared with the 
central level of state institutions that meet in the National Security Committee in Kampala. 
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 Int. Organization for Migration (2013): Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile, p. 60.  
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Nevertheless, this thesis focusses on the street-level of law enforcement. Not institutional 
structures of cooperation are analysed, but actual cooperation practices between street-
level bureaucrats.  
Biecker and Schlichte describe the UPF as highly self-referential (2014: 3). The findings of 
this research contradict this description. Police officers that enforce immigration laws rely 
on networks with other institutions:  
It’s a teamwork. Even other stakeholders are there. […] In every country there is a 
network of intelligence. […] So the players are many. Very many. Because me, I can 
go ahead but someone is also following from behind. (Police Officer Samuel)   
For the direct enforcement of immigration law my informants state that the main cooperation 
is between police officers of the CIID and immigration officers. This is stated by police offic-
ers: “We do this with our partners like immigration officers. We enforce the law together with 
them” (Police Officer Samuel). And this is also confirmed by immigration officers: “We do 
relate with them almost at the daily basis” (Immigration Officer Michael). In case of Post 
Entry Management the immigration officers call police officers to arrest immigrants with in-
valid papers. The police officers then take the immigrants to the immigration office. Here, 
their documents are checked. Afterwards, the police officers might take them further to the 
police station for detention. A similar cooperation is mentioned for On Entry Management 
at the border post: 
Now we work closely with the police. Most especially to prevent crime. And also if 
there are people who are supposed to be punished. Those ones we identify and 
hand them over to the police. […] Cause you cannot do these things in isolation. If 
a person, for example someone who is suspected to be smuggling, we hand over to 
police. (Immigration Officer John)  
This daily cooperation between police officers and immigration officers relates to their dif-
ferences in powers, knowhow and skills. Immigration officers on the one hand are trained 
and have developed skills of how to read and unscramble identification documents. On the 
other hand, police officers from the CIID are trained and skilled in checking informal settings 
outside offices. For undertaking arrests they are empowered by the law to carry and use 
weapons. The officers can be termed as specialists in different areas of work: “ground” and 
“paper work” (Beek & Göpfert 2011). Of course police and immigration officers carry out 
both areas of work, as they are often interrelated. But nevertheless, there are tendencies in 
the case of immigration law enforcement, and while ‘paper work’ concerns the handling of 
documents (for example passport reading) this is mostly happening inside immigration of-
fices and border posts. ‘Ground work’ on the other hand relates to work outside offices, for 
example during audit checks which are done by the police. Apart from these powers and 
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skills, the settings of police and immigration offices enhances their need for stable and du-
rable cooperation. The passport scanner and computer system is only available in the im-
migration office and not at the police station. In terms of an arrest, detention facilities are 
not found in the immigration office, but only inside the police station.  
Teamwork between immigration and police officers in Northern Uganda is happening at a 
very personal level. The officers know each other by names. During my research officers 
ask me to extend greetings to one another. This is not only the case for Post Entry Man-
agement but also in between the border posts and the regional office in Gulu. During my 
observation at the regional immigration office, Officer Michael calls his colleague Officer 
John at the border post in Elegu: 
He leans back while talking on the phone. They chat for long. It seems as if one 
colleague from Elegu is in hospital. Then they talk about another colleague. Michael 
says: “How can you behave like that? That is very poor, very childish.” He starts 
laughing. I have the impression as if he gets along very well with the other. When 
he finally hangs up the phone he tells me that John has informed him about South 
Sudanese refugees at the border: “They thinned out but they now come back.”  
This phone call illustrates the personal relations between the officers. Relevant information 
about immigration is shared during a relaxed chat on the phone which also includes per-
sonal conversation.  
For immigration law enforcement, a major network of information is the computer system. 
The same system is used at the border post and in the regional office, as well as in every 
other immigration office in Uganda. The digitalisation of information makes possible that 
information is shared even without personal contacts between individual immigration offic-
ers. Through the system, the same information is given to everyone who has access to the 
system. This access is restricted, and during my observations I only see immigration officers 
accessing it. But in order to find the relevant information from the whole data, a passport or 
at least a passport number that was given to an individual is required. Without this, the state 
actors lack information. Again, the centrality of passports becomes visible. It is not only 
institutional structure on the law level that enables state actors to establish cooperative net-
works and share information. Institutional networking is also enabled by passports, comput-
ers, scanners, and not to forget by mobile phones. 
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6.2 Informal Networking  
This subchapter presents informal networks between state actors and non-state actors: “al-
liances between state officials and individuals and groups in society [and] their existence 
outside the formal laws on the books” (Migdal & Schlichte 2005: 3). Current political anthro-
pologists focus on non-state actors, and illustrate that they are often engaged in policing 
and law enforcement practices (Lund 2007; Bellagamba & Klute 2008). One similar case is 
presented in the prologue of this thesis. Here, the escaping immigrant is stopped by a vio-
lent mob. Mob justice is a drastic example of policing beside the state. In this case, the mob 
is called by the police officers themselves. They shout “thief” in the local language and 
thereby make use of their knowledge about informal policing practices. Now, the arrest be-
comes a joint operation of the mob and the police. It is nevertheless a dangerous operation 
for the police officers themselves, who get beaten as well because of their plainclothes. But 
as they are part of the work team in this situation, the offenders of the mob do not get 
arrested or charged afterwards.  
Immigration law enforcement is said to be more monopolized by state authority than other 
areas (Torpey 2000: 5). Still, alliances are mentioned, for example community policing that 
helps to identify foreigners. “The best weapon is communities. They have very many eyes” 
(Police Officer Samuel). Community policing in Uganda is supported by the government in 
terms of decentralisation. It is considered as useful especially for law enforcement in vil-
lages where often no police posts are established (Baker 2004: 6). Such informal networks 
help out state agents to enforce the law, for example when their work lacks resources. But 
“[f]rom the very moment that state officials develop and mobilize extra-professional net-
works to access resources, they distance themselves from the centralized state, which can 
no longer control them” (Hamani 2014: 171). 
This chapter concentrates on cooperative alliances between state agents and inner-African 
immigrants in Northern Uganda.61 One of the main reasons why these actors establish re-
lations are passports. This corresponds to Matthew Hull who states: “The circulation of 
graphic artefacts creates associations among people that often differ from formal organiza-
tional structures and draw people outside the bureaucracy into bureaucratic practices” (Hull 
2012: 18). During my studies I recognized two patterns of informal networking practices 
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 Besides, there are networks that inner-African immigrants establish between each other. This be-
comes visible in the prologue where immigrants from different origins support each other, take food 
to the detention cell, and bring a forgotten document from the capital to help out a friend. Networks 
between immigrants and Ugandans as non-state actors are described during the audit check of 
Emma, where locals put in a good word for the immigrant with invalid papers. 
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between street-level bureaucrats and immigrants. These will be called: a) ‘to do business’ 
and b) ‘to make friends’.  
 
A) TO DO BUSINESS 
I come across the term ‘business’ many times during my research. It is often used when an 
alliance between officers and immigrants is expressed. After the incidents that are pre-
sented in the prologue, Bless tells me that one of the police inspectors contacted him and 
asked him if he wanted to do ‘business’ together with him. First I do not understand what 
kind of business they are talking about, but later I hear the term again. Several days after 
the audit check on Emma, he tells me that the policemen asked him to call whenever for-
eigners check in. One police officer told him that this was “his business” and Emma could 
help him. I also come across the term in my interviews: 
There are people they are called informants. They also work with immigration. Look-
ing for people without passport, people without visa. So they can inform the immi-
gration that they don’t have their passports. They just do, that is their business. (Im-
migrant, anonymous)  
In terms of community policing the UPF is said to use civilians as spies to get information 
to enforce the law. This is confirmed by one of my respondents: “We have what we call 
those people who spy. You cannot go to buy land in Kasese and you build a house and no 
one will bring information to the police” (Police Officer Noah). In case of immigration law 
enforcement, sometimes immigrants work together with officers and operate as spies.  
Ordinary people. Like for me, I can be an informant. I can work with immigration if I 
want. If I want I can make immigration my friend. Then I have to tell immigration, 
maybe I can know some people who don’t have papers, maybe my brothers. Some 
people without papers. I can also inform immigration. Now you can come and get 
him. (Immigrant, anonymous)  
The immigrants have to engage with the officers undercover and will not inform other immi-
grants about their networks with state agents. Later, Bless explains to me what the inspector 
meant by ‘business’. Bless should inform the police officer if one of his friends had no valid 
papers. When they were in a public place like a bar, he would pretend to get a phone call 
from his girlfriend and leave. Outside the bar, he would then call the inspector and tell him 
where to find the person. The police would come to the bar for an audit check and ask for 
passports.  
As described before, challenges of immigration law enforcement at the border lead to the 
increase of passport controls inside Uganda which focus on informal settings. Not every 
informal setting can be checked. So, the officers focus on immigration ‘hot spots’ as it was 
54 
 
described earlier. Another strategy are ‘business networks’ where officers engage with im-
migrants and benefit from their inside knowledge. Here, immigrants pre-select informal 
places for audit checks. They guarantee that the officers will be ‘successful’ there in detect-
ing offences against the immigration law. Especially outside offices, police work relies on 
such relations between officers and locals. To gain inside knowledge “one of the main rou-
tine activities of patrolmen is the establishment and maintenance of familiar relationships 
with individual members” (Bittner 1967: 707). Apart from the lack of manpower another 
challenge for police officers is the lack of language skills that would be necessary to spy on 
inner-African immigrants (and this is more than understandable due to over two thousand 
languages that are spoken in Africa). Language skills of immigrants can fill this gap. There-
fore, the establishment of a ‘business network’ with them can be seen as beneficial for 
immigration law enforcement in informal settings.  
But as the examples demonstrate, such networks are not always successfully established. 
More often, officers merely attempt to engage with immigrants. Their relation will fizzle out 
when immigrants do not call them and refuse to engage in their ‘business’.  
 
B) TO MAKE FRIENDS 
Another term that is used to express informal relations between officers and immigrants is 
‘friendship’.  
It’s like you have a friend who is policeman. Noah, I have a problem, my permit has 
expired. So if you approach me in case there is an operation, I will say he or she 
phoned me. I am aware. No one will touch you. But when you hide you are a bad 
person. (Police Officer Noah)  
From the officer’s perspective the term is used to express a worthwhile relationship of trust. 
The expression ‘bad person’ on the other hand can be related to security discourses as it 
correlates with similar expressions like ‘wrong ones’ and ‘wrong elements’ among immi-
grants. As shown above (“If I want I can make immigration my friend”) the term is also used 
in the same context as the ‘business’ term.  
Apart from this, I come across a different meaning when I need to get a visa myself. Here, 
‘friendship’ expresses a relationship of immigrants to an officer who can provide them with 
documents and extensions of permits. 
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My friends take me to the office of their brother62. Prince is an immigrant from West 
Africa. He has been in the country for many years, has a Ugandan wife and children, 
and owns a resident permit. The others treat him with respect and address him as 
‘Sir’. We ask his advice about our documents. I have a valid tourist visa but need to 
get a student’s visa. A friend of mine, Bless from Nigeria, has an expired visitor’s 
visa and needs an extension. Prince tells us that he is going to call his friend from 
the immigration. We wait while he phones him. Then he tells us that he can arrange 
to meet him after work. We should leave our passports with him, pay a certain 
amount of money, and he will get our visas done the next day. We discuss what to 
do. I decide to get my papers on the official way which means to go to the head-
quarters in Kampala. Bless on the other hand tells me that he needs to get his visa 
through Prince’s friend. He tells me that this was the only way for him, and that 
otherwise with his invalid papers he would get arrested at the headquarters. 
Inner-African migrants often go on a “semi-documented path” to gain papers (Bakewell 
2007: 6).  It is even said that many prefer such clandestine ways over official ways, and that 
an immigrant may “count on a reception network composed of members of his family or 
ethnic group who have […] ‘made it’” (Ricca 1989: 60). In this case, Bless benefits from the 
network of Prince who was been in Uganda for long. His network does not only consist of 
immigrants but also of other ‘friends’ such as state officials. In contrast to the ‘business’ 
pattern this time the network is shared with other immigrants. It is beneficial for them and 
will not lead to a passport control, but on the contrary arrests are avoided.  
How do immigrants engage with such ‘friends’ for the first time? “We can go to the office 
direct and we also tell them our problem. […] From there we get to know each other. Maybe 
sometimes when we feel like we don’t want to go there, we can call one of them, and they 
can help us” (Immigrant, anonymous). The first contact is made in the office setting, but 
later the network is maintained outside of the offices and meetings are arranged after work 
hours. “Maybe we can meet the good ones, they will say: Let us help you to do it. So you 
will not enter the office. They help you to do it” (Immigrant, anonymous). Here, the officers 
are termed as ‘good ones’ that can ‘help you’. The relation to an officer as a ‘friend’ is pre-
sented as desirable.  
The question is, what kind of friendship is involved here? It seems as if the ‘friends’ from 
the police or immigration do not engage with immigrants for other purposes apart from their 
papers and statuses. The relation is therefore limited to these issues. It is questionable how 
reliable the network really is, as “despite a good relationship, a police officer may still en-
force the law against you” (Beek 2012: 560). Another aspect of the term ‘friend’ is, that it 
clearly contradicts the ideal type of bureaucrats. As mentioned above, the ideal type does 
not engage with the public in a personal way so that he or she will never favour an individual                                                            
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 The term ‘brother’ does not label actual kinship. I am told by my friends that they use the term to 
express that they share the same mother tongue.  
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over others. Authors such as Parsons stress the opposition of the public/official and the 
private sphere. It is described that personal relations such as friendship and love are strictly 
separated from official relationships. Meeting a ‘friend’ from the immigration outside of the 
office to get papers done blurs the line between both spheres. Informal networks demon-
strate again that “public and private do not exist in straightforward terms” (Baker 2005: 37).  
Practices of immigration law enforcement cannot be understood if informality is treated as 
failing the bureaucratic norm. Informality is always part of bureaucracy and crucial for suc-
cessful law enforcement on the street-level. From the perspective of the bureaucrats infor-
mal networks become understandable as they help them to handle challenges of their work 
setting. But why do immigrants engage in such networks? This will be analysed in the next 
chapter.  
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7. “Money is the Law” 
This chapter deals with the phrase ‘money is the law’ from one of my informants. Taking the 
phrase literally, it will be discussed how money as a law relates to the official and written 
immigration law. The chapter starts with a presentation of how discretion increases the in-
certitude of immigrants concerning the official immigration law. In practice, this law is not 
enforced automatically in one exclusive way but it is described as a ‘two way system’. 
‘Money as the law’ is formulated by one of my informants: Prince, the resident immigrant 
from West Africa. He is consulted by other immigrants in terms of visas because of his 
experience, knowledge and networks to state officials. He uses the expression to point to 
money that is informally paid by immigrants to state officials to get their papers in order. 
Such a practice is commonly referred to as corruption. In this chapter, the informal payment 
of money is treated as a practice, and this practice is described and located in the setting.  
All in all, this chapter mainly reflects the immigrants’ perspectives. State officials do not 
mention practices of informally paid money in my interviews directly. Some of the perspec-
tives presented here surely base on the widespread prejudice about the Ugandan police 
(and the police in Africa in general) as a corrupt institution (a perspective that is also shared 
by most Ugandans). But apart from that, the findings derive from reports of actual experi-
ences, and reflect one (unintentional participant) observation. 
Coming back to informal networking that was discussed in the previous chapter: money is 
a major characteristic of informal networks between immigrants and state agents.63 With 
this notion it becomes obvious why such a relationship might be called ‘business’ by the 
actors themselves. It will be demonstrated that networks and cooperation contain power 
imbalances. While some are able to engage in these networks, others are excluded, for 
example because they do not have money.  
 
7.1 Immigration Law Enforcement as a “Two Way System” 
What are the prevalent outcomes when immigration law is enforced? As presented above 
audit checks as a strategy for immigration law enforcement do not lead to the same outcome 
every time. During audit checks, the outcome of the situation is rather unclear. As mentioned 
before, ambiguity is always part of street-level bureaucracy and so is discretion. Research-
ers state that discretion is a crucial element of police work because enforcing the law every 
time they come across an offence is not possible. It might not be possible in general, and                                                            
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 During my research, networking also happens for instance by inviting a person for a drink or 
lunch. Nevertheless, the payment of money is primarily reported and will therefore be focused here.  
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becomes even more problematic when resources for law enforcement are lacking. The UPF 
is said to have a lack of manpower while their workload is high, which is especially men-
tioned in the literature for the CID and for Northern Uganda.64 In the prologue, this lack of 
resources was mentioned in terms of overcrowded detention cells. 
In case of an offence against the immigration law, the law level prescribes that the immigrant 
has to be taken to court, which includes an arrest and can result in deportation. The costs 
for this legal process are high. When I ask Police Officer Samuel who pays for deportations 
and trials he says “It depends”, but he is interrupted by his secretary: “The government.” 
Samuel agrees: “That is why it has implications on our economy.” In case of immigration 
law “often governments themselves indicate that they do not wish the law to be observed 
too strictly” (Ricca 1989: 58). Therefore, deviation from the official legal framework during 
immigration law enforcement cannot be generalized as evidence for a ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ 
state. On the contrary, the practices could even be wanted by the government.  
On the law level, there are two possibilities to penalise offences against the immigration law 
of Uganda: a) the payment of a fine for each day that a person was inside the country 
without valid status; or b) being deported. The fine increased from thirty to one hundred 
dollars per day in 2014. Certainly, only few inner-African immigrants in Uganda will be able 
to pay this amount at all. Deportations on the other hand are happening. In 2012, about 
forty percent of a total of 840 registered arrests of illegal immigrants were deported.65 Ac-
cording to the spokesperson of the Ugandan Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration 
Control, over 1000 illegally staying immigrants were deported in 2014, mainly to China.66 
Nevertheless, the efficiency of deportation in case of immigration from the neighbouring 
countries is challenged. One example of Congolese sex-workers in Northern Uganda is 
given: “So many of them were supported and taken back to Congo. But you know after a 
short time they came back. So they are back and now you can’t take them again because 
they will come back” (LC5 of Gulu).  
The findings of this study lead to the assumption that deportation is an exception of immi-
gration law enforcement in Uganda. In police work, officers sometimes develop “alternative 
sanctions” (Bittner 1967: 702). A quote from one of my informants indicates that practices 
of immigration law enforcement often deviate from the written immigration law:  
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 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006): The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Ac-
countability in Uganda, p. 19. 
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 Numbers according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, In: Int. Organization for Migration (2013): 
Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile, p. 44. 66 New Vision (2015): 35 illegal immigrants arrested. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/ 
1328995/35-illegal-immigrants-arrested (accessed May 06, 2016). 
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You can be punished straight away, but you can also punish someone and take him 
to court to punish. From there he is deported. It’s a two way system. (Police Officer 
Samuel)  
The formulation ‘system’ indicates that the officer considers both ways as established, nor-
mal and proper to use. The punishment along the ‘court way’ correlates with what was de-
scribed before: the sentence of a fine or deportation that is pronounced by court. But what 
does ‘to punish straight away’ mean in case of the second ‘alternative way’? Tidjani Alou 
identifies an “unofficial establishment of an alternative legal system controlled by the crimi-
nal investigation department” in the cases of Niger, Benin and Senegal (Tidjani Alou 2006: 
174). It comes to an arrest, but the police might not take every case to court.67 Instead, a 
person might be released after spending several days in detention. Detention itself is treated 
as a sufficient punishment because of the “terrible conditions of custody” (ibid: 153). In re-
lation to the setting, a detention cell is “a place where control can be maximized” (Holdaway 
1980: 89). Cells are often cramped and shared by several detainees. This often means 
violation of the personal space (Goffman 1971: 68 ff.). Conditions of detention are highly 
criticised in Uganda (Mushemeza Dickens 2008: 10).  
Detainees are often held in overcrowded facilities, which may have an impact on 
their health and which increases their risk of being subjected to torture and other 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Most detention facilities in 
Uganda are not suitable for housing detainees, and there are frequent challenges in 
providing food, water and other basic necessities such as hygiene, sanitation and 
bedding. Moreover, many of these facilities are dilapidated, overcrowded and have 
inadequate space, lighting and ventilation. Most inmates do not have access to ad-
equate food and water especially in police cells. Inmates often lack clothing and 
bedding, access to health services, facilities for personal hygiene and access to 
opportunities for exercise. (…) Detainees are often subjected to torture and ill treat-
ment by their fellow inmates. 68 
The detention facilities of the CPS in Gulu are described in the prologue of this thesis and 
resemble the conditions described above. The UHRC reports that in 2014 most complaints 
about detention facilities and overstay concerned Northern Uganda, while Gulu came            
second.69  
In terms of immigration law enforcement immigrants in Northern Uganda are not treated 
differently to criminal suspects. In case of an arrest they are kept together with them in the                                                            
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 Such a pre-selection of court cases by the police is not only practiced in Africa. Blankenburg 
states that negotiations take place in German police offices whether events should become rec-
orded cases or not (Blankenburg 1995: 15). 
68
  Karugonjo-Segawa, Roselyn (2012): Pre-trial Detention in Uganda. APCOF Policy Paper, p. 1; 
10. 
69
 Uganda Human Rights Commission (2015): 2014, 17th Annual Report, p. 18.  
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same facilities. One case of overstay in detention cells due to an offence against the immi-
gration law is reported in this study by a police officer during an informal conversation. Sev-
eral Eritreans were arrested during an audit check in a restaurant in Gulu, all of them former 
refugees from Israel.70 Together with their trafficker they crossed the border to Uganda with-
out getting registered. I meet Police Officer Samuel eight days after the arrest. He shows 
me their papers from Israel. Then he informs me that the Eritreans are still in custody, but 
that he is going to release them today because they were “good people” and “traumatized 
refugees”. This demonstrates a case where the court is avoided. For the officer, the refu-
gees are ‘good people’. They are not ‘bad persons’ and therefore mean no threat for the 
national security as defined above. Eight days in the detention cell is seen as enough pun-
ishment because the detainees are after all ‘traumatized’. Of course overstaying in deten-
tion is not always intended as a punishment. It often is simply a problem of administration 
delivery (Hamani 2014: 163).  
This case of overstaying illustrates the power imbalance between state officials and immi-
grants. For immigrants the officer’s decision-making under discretion can lead to drastic 
outcomes such as detention in (what can truly be called) inhuman conditions. As a ‘two way 
system’ there are alternatives to the written immigration law in situations of immigration law 
enforcement. So even with knowledge of the law, an immigrant can never be sure about 
the outcome of such a situation. He or she is left in the dark in a situation of uncertainty. In 
many cases, immigrants in Uganda do not know the immigration law of Uganda, and they 
are also not aware of their legal rights. Possibly, some have made bad experiences with 
police officers from their country of origin before.71 They might be afraid of encountering 
state security agents, because they do not expect them to follow laws and regulations but 
to make arbitrary use of their powers. “They might think we beat them up. Here we arrest, 
but these people don’t know that people have human rights. They are a little bit backwards 
than the Ugandans” (DPC of Gulu). 
On the other hand, police and immigration officers study law to a certain level as part of 
their training. Compared to immigrants they are experts of the written immigration law. This                                                            
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 There are rumours about an agreement between Israel and Uganda that in exchange for arms 
Uganda is taking refugees from Israeli detention centres (see for example BBC [2016]: Israel's un-
wanted African migrants. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35475403 [accessed May 06, 2016]; 
Vice [2013]: Uganda Is Taking Israel's Unwanted Asylum Seekers to Get Cheaper Weapons. 
http://www.vice.com/read/uganda-is-the-first-country-to-swap-african-refugees-for-israeli-weapons 
[accessed May 06, 2016]).  
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 Such stories are not uncommon. One refugee from Ethiopia for example tells me that without any 
reason he and his friends were beaten badly by the Ethiopian police on the streets when they went 
out at night. Another immigrant from Nigeria tells me that he got battered by soldiers on a market 
simply because he sold camouflage clothes.  
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gap of knowledge can be used in an encounter by officers to increase their own power, and 
to increase the uncertainty of the immigrant. During the audit check of Emma that was de-
scribed earlier, the inspector threats the Ethiopian asylum seeker with detention (“We 
should take him at least for one night”). A report about threatening is also mentioned in the 
prologue. Bless tells me: “They were telling me that they are going to deport me. That they 
are going to do this, do that, to scare me.” As described earlier, both cases then lead to the 
informal payment of money to the officers.  
Nevertheless, the detention and overstay of the Eritreans remains an exceptional case in 
my study. More often, situations of immigration law enforcement do not get that far. From 
the immigrants’ perspective another outcome is described: “So if they don’t want to take 
you to court, they will tell you: ‘Now you have to do your visa, we put your visa in order.’ 
Then you can give them some small money for helping you” (Immigrant, anonymous). So 
there seems to be a third way apart from being detained without a trial or going to court. 
Both of these ways include an arrest, but paying informal money is described as an alter-
native where an arrest is avoided. This way, which is often termed corruption, will be ana-
lysed in the next subchapter.  
 
7.2 Locating Corruption 
According to Transparency International, Uganda gains high ranks among countries of East 
Africa. In 2012 it is called the most corrupt country of the region.72 Corruption being wide-
spread in Uganda is confirmed by authors who state that “today, corruption is a way of life” 
(Mutibwa 1992: 196), or “corruption is everywhere” (Nystrand 2014: 826). The police is 
viewed as the most corrupt institution by Ugandans.73 Corruption is said to be found in all 
spheres of police work, while the CID is most known for bribery and embezzlement (Ngufor 
Forkum 2007: 31).  
The following subchapter mainly deals with informally paid money during audit checks. Dur-
ing interviews, audit checks were presented as highly related to corruption by immigrants: 
“We know if they come, they need money. Even if you don’t have paper you have to give 
them money. Then you will be safe” (Immigrant, anonymous). Corruption can not only be 
found during Post Entry Management but is also mentioned to be happening at borders, for                                                            
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 Transparency International (2012): The East African Bribery Index 2012: Bribery levels remain 
high in Kenya. http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/the_east_african_bribery_index_ 
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example the border between Uganda and South Sudan (Schomerus & Titeca 2012). Over-
all, even if corruption is described as common for state bureaucrats in Uganda, it cannot be 
generalized. Not everyone engages in informal payments. If an officer does so, he or she 
cannot be judged as immoral, and to be seeking his or her private gain. Corruption rather 
becomes understandable with regards to the institutional or social background of the prac-
tice. Corruption might be motivated by social pressure, for example by expectations of fam-
ily members (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 116). Sometimes, bureaucrats in Uganda 
are encouraged by peers and families to be corrupt (Bukuluki 2013: 32). In addition to that, 
Ugandan bureaucrats on the street-level complain about low salaries (Therkildsen 2014: 
118). Little payment and poor housing are also mentioned by two of my informants. Police 
officers in Gulu live in police barracks, small iron huts in the middle of the city. One of my 
informants, a policewoman, moved out to another area of the town. She tells me that the 
barracks are not a good place to raise children.  
There are several studies about corruption in Uganda. Most of them deal with statistics and 
surveys, or reflect on reasons for corruption. This subchapter analyses corruption as a con-
crete practice and locates it in the setting. Overall, practices of informal payments are lo-
cated backstage and hidden from the public eye. Offices are mostly avoided, but informal 
settings such as bars and restaurants are preferred. “A bribe is a ritual that resists the pan-
opticon. […] Corruption resists light and scrutiny. It is optically veiled, prefers shadows and 
the backstage. It summons the senses and identities in a radically different way” (Visvana-
than 2012: 4). As described in the prologue, money is paid outside the office when two 
officers take the immigrant to his customers. The payment happens away from the office 
setting in a rather informal environment. In case of the ‘friend’ of Prince from the immigra-
tion, the meeting is also arranged outside the office. In the case of the audit check in the 
guesthouse, Emma later tells me that he gave money to the officer. Again the informal pay-
ment did not happen inside a state institution but in the guesthouse reception. Emma tells 
me that he gave money to the officer when everybody else was outside. Here, the reception 
suddenly becomes the backstage of the setting. Backstages are not always fixed in the 
setting, they rather have to be mutually established in a situation. While the public is con-
centrating on the compound, the money can be given to the officer in the reception without 
being noticed.  
Another case about refugees who try to get citizen papers is reported by an asylum seeker. 
In a commission of the OPM, several representatives vote whether or not a person should 
get citizen papers. The immigrant describes how refugees use informal networks to connect 
with these officials:  
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You have to call them in town, eh? You have to get them in a bar or somewhere 
else. Because you are a good man, what, what… You have to give them some 
pocket money. […] You call them evening time or weekend. They don’t like people 
to see them when they are working. Because other people they can complain. (Im-
migrant, anonymous)  
Practices of corruption can fail. Knowledge is important to succeed. The same immigrant 
himself tells me how he had failed to get the papers because of insufficient knowledge.  
I have to give them money indirectly. For those people. Those who are in the voting. 
Maybe 200, 200. Then please raise your hand if the question comes. […] Then those 
people who got money, they raise hand. Those people who don’t know me and they 
didn’t get money, they cannot raise their hands. That’s why I fell down. You have to 
divide for the people. When you give everybody, everybody likes you. After you get 
what? The paper. (Immigrant, anonymous)  
An “Anthropology of Corruption” studies the phenomenon and its cultural manifestation: “We 
may also discover that there are rules (albeit informal and pragmatic) and cultural codes 
that govern the way corruption itself should, or does, take place” (Haller & Shore 2005: 8). 
Pragmatic rules must be known and learned. They are partially based on implicit knowledge. 
During this study, it happens that informal payments are not only reported by my informants. 
Additionally, I make my own experiences in an unplanned and unintentional participant ob-
servation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To get a student’s visa I decide not to rely on 
Prince’s ‘friend’, but to go to the headquarters in Kampala and use the official way.  
 
I enter the office. There is a front desk in the middle of the room. Chairs stand 
squeezed around the desk. Several people sit here and wait. A man in suit sits be-
hind the desk. I ask him about the process of getting a student’s visa. He looks at 
my documents. Then he tells me: “This process takes time.” I should come back in 
one week. I ask him if there is a way that I could pay some extra fees to make it 
faster because I have to go back to the North. I ask if there is a “short cut”, thinking 
about express passports that one can get in Germany. He looks at me: “You want a 
short cut?” Then he tells me to have a seat. Immediately he walks away with my 
documents to another room to make photocopies. During my wait, the other people 
are not called in by officers at all. A young Indian man next to me says to everyone: 
“Now it is almost lunchtime. Nothing will happen today.” He tells me that he comes 
in every day but his documents are still not processed. When the officer comes back, 
I ask him how much the visa will cost me. He looks at me and simply says: “I think I 
told you.” I am bewildered and I start to realise that it might have been a little naïve 
to think there was an official express visa, titled as a ‘short cut’.  
When the officer later comes back from an office, he walks past the front desk to-
wards the entrance and calls me to follow him. I walk behind him to the parking 
ground. He stops in between the parking cars. From here our bodies are shielded 
from views. I am really nervous now. He gets my passport from his pocket and 
shows me new stamps on one of the pages. He says in a low voice “You give me 
100.”Hectically, I rummage around in my backpack and get my purse. I am confused 
if he means dollars or shillings, and I am even too agitated to count the notes. I 
stutter: “I don’t think I have enough” when the officer interferes my confusion: “This 
money is ok.” I give him my notes without counting at all, and he pockets them, 
passes me my passport, and then walks back to the office. I walk to the exit of the 
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ministry, relieved to have my papers but still in bewilderment about what has just 
happened.  
 
Again, a backstage is used for practices of informally paid money. The office where the 
people waiting are sitting around the desk almost has the structure of a panopticon, but the 
parking ground allows me and the officer to be unseen. My confusion during the whole 
situation derives from the fact that this is the first time for me to participate in a practice of 
informal payment of money to a state official. In the situation I feel very aware that I have 
no knowledge at all of how to behave in this situation. Asking the officer in front of everyone 
how much he would charge me for a ‘short cut’ definitely is a case of dropping a brick, and 
I doubt that my informants will ever do something similar themselves. I had not developed 
any routines that could have been useful for such a practice. Therefore, I could not handle 
the situation with confidence and in the end paid much more money than the officer de-
manded.  
Belonging to implicit knowledge, body skills are needed in situations of informal payments. 
In the situation above, the officer hides my passport in his pocket until we change the set-
ting. On the parking ground he leaves his arms close to the body and uses a low voice to 
talk. During the interviews and during other conversations, my informants often use ges-
tures if they talk about such practices. When Emma tells me about the payment of a police 
officer in the reception, he leans over his desk, stretches out one hand underneath the table 
as if he passes money to someone in front. Here, the furniture is used as a barrier for others 
to see what is happening. Joseph, the Ugandan bar employee from the Ethiopian guest-
house, later tells me how to successfully corrupt a police officer in his office if you are 
brought there. He would beckon the officer, using a low voice: “Can I see you for a mo-
ment?” They would go outside the office and walk around a corner. Here, Joseph would 
give the officer some money. While he is telling me this he holds his hand close to his body 
and in front of his pocket. He presses his thumb against two fingers as if he holds a note. 
Then he tells me that the officer would accept the money. Thereby he puts his fingers into 
his pocket. The officer would say with a wagging finger “Don’t do it again” concerning the 
reason why the other was brought to the office. The officer would then return to the office 
alone. Joseph seems to know exactly how to behave in order to be successful in corruption. 
He knows that an informal setting is needed, outside the office and around the corner to 
hide from views. The way he presents the gestures look routinized and he seems to be 
confident about what he is doing.  
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7.3 Discussion 
This subchapter discusses the phrase ‘money is the law’. It is an attempt to make under-
standable why many immigrants engage in informal networks, and why they often prefer to 
pay money informally instead of following bureaucratic processes as they are prescribed in 
the law level.  
Practices of informally paid money are commonly generalized under the term corruption. 
African states (and especially African police officers) are often equated with corruption 
(Vigneswaran & Hornberger 2009: 1). A common definition, which even used by the World 
Bank, is that corruption is the abuse of a public office for private gain. “This definition re-
duces corruption simply to a problem of dishonest individuals or ‘rotten apples’ working in 
the public sector” (Haller & Shore 2005: 2). Anthropologist criticize this concept. They ques-
tion if corruption should be measured at all like in the indexes of Transparency International. 
They also highlight that corruption is never a neutral concept and always implies moral 
condemnation. The anthropological perspective on corruption on the other hand does not 
treat “corruption as a dysfunctional aspect of state organizations” (Gupta 2006 [1995]: 212). 
Anthropologists try to understand corruption through emic perspectives. “[C]orruption may 
not be legal, but it nonetheless has its own morality, at least in the eyes of the local public” 
(Haller & Shore 2005: 12). 
It needs to be emphasized that the informants of this study rarely use the term corruption 
themselves when they speak about practices of informally paid money. They rather describe 
such practices by other terms that were mentioned before, for instance ‘to do business’, 
which relates audit checks and informal networks to payment. Other common descriptions 
are ‘to make a friend’ that can ‘help you’. These formulations highlight the relationship and 
cooperativeness of an informal network that is based on informal payments. The term ‘short 
cut’ from my own experience implies informal payment for an unofficial bureaucratic opera-
tion. Other examples are “give them some small money for helping you” where ‘small’ might 
contrast ‘big money’ like the official fees; and “give them some pocket money” which re-
sembles the practice of putting money in one’s pocket, a gesture that was imitated by Jo-
seph as it is described above.  
In contrast to corruption as a generalizing term, these emic expressions present local con-
cepts of informally paid money with fine distinctions. Some terms are rather positive 
(‘friends’, ‘to help’) and may express that the payment in this case is accepted, while other 
times practices are criticised: “It is an offence to stay without a coin in the pocket. Because 
they believe you steal if you don’t have it” (Police Officer Noah). Here ‘stealing’ indicates 
corruption as illegitimate and a crime. “In Uganda, the term corruption is less abstract and 
legalistic and rather a question of degree. In this popular sense a person is corrupt if he 
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‘eats too much’” (Schlichte 2005: 171). Vocabulary relating to food and eating is not only 
used in Uganda, but also common in other African countries to describe practices of cor-
ruption (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 121 f.; Bako-Arifari 2006). After I get my student’s 
visa my friends inform me that the immigration officer at the headquarters took too much 
money from me: “They eat your money now.” Another case where informal payment is crit-
icised is the payment in the prologue. Bless tells me that he “lost too much money”. It seems 
as if the acceptance of corruption relates to the rate that is paid as well as the scale of 
corruption. Large scale corruption (for example on the national level) is criticised in the North 
of Uganda, whereby local-level corruption is perceived “as part of everyday life. It [is] seen 
as annoying and in need of change, but it [is] just the way things [are]” (Nystrand 2014: 
828). 
For immigrants in Uganda bureaucratic processes often are not understandable as they 
remain faceless processes (Sandvik 2011: 19). As described in the beginning of this chap-
ter, immigrants are often uncertain about the outcomes of immigration law enforcement 
situations, partially because of their ignorance but most of all because of unstable law en-
forcement practices. A case in point is Dickson from Nigeria. I am told that his bag was 
stolen in the bus from Kampala when he travelled to the North. His passport was inside and 
he went to the nearest police post to report that his passport got stolen. He was told by a 
policeman to wait, but then he saw the officer coming back with further policemen. Dickson 
was sure that they came to arrest him as an illegal immigrant and he took off. The same 
day he travelled to the Kenyan border, used panya roads to cross the border unnoticed and 
got a new passport from there so that he could come back to Uganda. Running away illus-
trates the immigrant’s uncertainty of official bureaucratic processes. Because of this uncer-
tainty he decides not to wait and to report the passport’s loss, but instead chooses the 
informal way to get a new document.  
According to the findings of this study, many inner-African immigrants in Northern Uganda 
prefer to use informal networks to extend documents and avoid to go to offices directly. 
Their networks are grounded on the informal payment of money. These networks are seen 
as more reliable than official processes. The ‘money is the law’ formulation expresses this 
perspective. The expression ‘money is the law’ widens the perspective on law. From this 
perspective, law can be anything and not just official regulations and written state law.74 The 
outcome of an informal payment is seen as more predictable, while the written immigration 
“law is perceived as terrifying and unpredictable” (Tidjani Alou 2006: 157).                                                             
74
 This perspective relates to the concept of legal pluralism (Benda-Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann 
2006). 
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But paying money informally to an officer does not dissolve uncertainty for the immigrant 
completely. It can even increase insecurity of immigrants. One of my informants expresses 
his fear that after paying money to an officer he will be seen as a source of money and will 
be asked for money again. Money as a scarce resource might run out. Without money in-
formal networks to officers cannot be activated. I came across such situations when immi-
grants overstayed their visa simply because they did not have money for the extension. 
“You have to have money to move here. You have to have money. If no money, you cannot 
do anything” (Immigrant, anonymous). Being poor always has an impact on encounters with 
street-level bureaucrats. “The poorer people are, the greater the influence street-level bu-
reaucrats tend to have over them” (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 6). After explaining how to avoid a 
trial by corrupting police officers, Joseph tells me about the people that overstay in the de-
tention cells: “Those boys in the police station are the ones that don’t have money. If you 
don’t have money then this is a big problem.” This is confirmed in a report about pre-trial 
detention in Uganda: “Detainees who are poor and cannot afford legal services often remain 
in custody for a longer time”.75 
Even if an immigrant has enough money to pay, the practice is limited. An example is the 
arrest of the Ethiopian who was suspected of belonging to Al-Shabaab only because of his 
skin colour. One explanation is that in this case the arrest could not be avoided because 
several security organisations were involved. In Uganda, a plurality of state actors is in-
volved in security maintenance.76 Sometimes, this leads to confusion of roles and respon-
sibilities: “The army and other security agencies arrested suspects without consulting the 
police and then dumped them in police cells. The police were afraid to release such detain-
ees, for fear of the army or security agency reaction.”77 It might come to overstays and false 
arrests, but it also means that an informal network between an immigrant and only one state 
actor of one institution cannot always be successfully activated, because in some cases, he 
or she might not be at the controls.  
I am told about one case of deportation. Dickson from Nigeria immigrated to Uganda several 
years ago and has a child with his Ugandan girlfriend. He was deported to Nigeria once 
when he was found with an expired visa. I ask a friend why Dickson was deported and he 
tells me: “Because that one has reached the headquarters. Immigration cannot even do                                                            
75 Karugonjo-Segawa, Roselyn (2012): Pre-trial Detention in Uganda. APCOF Policy Paper, p. 1. 
76
 One example of joint operation between the UPF and the UPDF that became especially relevant 
concerning terrorism discourses is the JATF. The Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force is criticized of 
abusing human rights, especially concerning its detention facilities (Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative [2006]: The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda, p. 9; 13). 
77
 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006): The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Ac-
countability in Uganda, p. 13. 
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anything about it. They have to deport now.” This is one exceptional case in this study where 
the official immigration law is enforced. An explanation is that here payments to single of-
ficers on the street level are not sufficient, because other actors are involved that are more 
powerful: the court and higher ranks in the headquarters.  
Other times, immigrants totally lack such explanations for bureaucratic decision-making. 
After his first deportation, Dickson returned to Uganda. But back in Germany I get a mes-
sage from him and I am surprised that the message comes from Nigeria. He tells me that 
he was deported again. He went to the immigration headquarters in Kampala with a valid 
visa to get an extension on the official way. There, the officers simply refused to give him 
the extension. He tells me that for him, their decision is still incomprehensible. This time, he 
does not have enough money to travel back to Uganda but stays in Nigeria without his 
family. 
The last example reflects that from the perspective of immigrants, insecurities are part of 
regular bureaucratic processes of immigration law enforcement in Uganda. Immigrants 
therefore often prefer to engage in informal payments and informal networks with officers. 
These are perceived as more stable and reliable in practice. From this perspective, corrup-
tion is not per se negative but sometimes favoured. On the official way, immigrants have to 
enter offices. The office setting itself pre-structures the encounter of an immigrant and a 
state official. Offices are designed to put regular bureaucratic practices into focus. There 
are few backstages where hidden practices can take place. Informal payments cannot eas-
ily happen unnoticed. Sometimes there are awareness signs on the walls, like the writing 
“Do not corrupt us” in the CPS of Gulu which is mentioned in the prologue. Informal settings 
on the other hand provide shields from the attention of others. Awareness signs cannot be 
found here. There is no pre-structured seat arrangement. People approach each other with 
more equal territories. State agents cannot be distinguished from civilians by outsiders. 
Therefore, informal settings imply more freedom and flexibility than offices.  
Informal settings such as bars are often used for meeting ‘friends’. The established relation 
to a familiar officer who is termed as a ‘friend’ contrasts the ideal type of bureaucrats that 
remain anonymous and interchangeable. A network relation might be perceived as more 
reliable and stable than faceless bureaucracy, especially when bureaucrats in practice fol-
low more than one way during law enforcement.  
In addition to that, money itself can be perceived as more reliable than bureaucratic pro-
cesses. For immigrants, money (at least for those who have it) is physically and practically 
available in encounters with state officials. As a boundary object it can lead to the informal 
cooperation between officers and immigrants. For all participants, bank notes are meaning-
ful and useful. They are flexible and can be integrated in any situation. Money is small 
enough to be hidden from the public eye, for example in a pocket. During an encounter, it 
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can easily be brought in by only small and simple body movements. Like passports, money 
is an “immutable mobile” (Latour 2006: 299). Notes have stable inscriptions, and are there-
fore countable and calculable, equally by everyone. In contrast to a passport, the infor-
mation that is inscribed in a banknote is less complex. The relevant information of value 
and currency is visible and accessible for everybody. On the other hand, information that is 
inscribed in a passport is not equally accessible. It needs a passport reading machine and 
access to the computer system of the immigration department to read the whole content.  
This chapter presents how making use of money can (to a certain extent) be seen as eman-
cipatory for immigrants in their uncertain situation concerning immigration law enforcement. 
Informal payments that are commonly termed as corruption cannot be understandable if 
they are generalized and judged as moral failures. 
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8. Conclusion 
Immigration is the eye of the state. It is a very strong arm for security. Very strong. I 
think, without it I don’t see any state surviving. (Immigration Officer John) 
This thesis is a study on state bureaucracy, whereby one area of state bureaucracy is fo-
cused in particular: the dealing of the state with immigrants. It looks at immigration law 
enforcement in Northern Uganda. Instead of studying the law level alone (which means the 
legal and institutional framework in Uganda) actual practices are analysed on the street 
level (Lipsky 2010 [1980]). This thesis shows that in practice, immigration law is not en-
forced automatically. Law enforcement situations do not lead to only one outcome. Enforce-
ment is rather described as a ‘more than one way system’. There might be some specific 
challenges in a post-conflict area such as Northern Uganda that prohibit straight law en-
forcement. But it is also said that to some extent immigration law always remains “unen-
forceable” (Vigneswaran & Hornberger 2009: 9).  
Many informal practices are described in this thesis. It becomes visible that informality is a 
crucial part of police and immigration work. For instance, informal networks between police 
officers and immigrants appear to be a useful strategy to cope with challenges of immigra-
tion law enforcement. Informal practices are not only found in the context of African states 
where they are often interpreted as being signs of ‘weakness’ or ‘failure’. Rather, as re-
searchers highlight, formality and informality are equal elements of bureaucratic work eve-
rywhere in the world. Often, there are “good organisational reasons” (Garfinkel & Bittner 
1967) for informality, and for the development of alternative paths beside the ones pre-
scribed by the law level.  
All in all, state bureaucracy is based on the existence and on the combination of passports 
and documents (Latour 2006: 297). Documents “precipitate the formation of shifting net-
works and groups of people inside and outside the bureaucracy” (Hull 2003: 291). It is 
shown how money and passports shape and enable the establishment of informal networks 
between officers and immigrants. Apart from that, passports are incorporated in all practices 
of immigration law enforcement. Officers that deal with immigration law enforcement on the 
street-level encounter ambiguous situations. Categorization work is an attempt to reduce 
that ambiguity. This is systematically done through passport controls at the border of Elegu 
or inside the country in Gulu.  
Worldwide, states develop “increasingly sophisticated technologies” when it comes to im-
migration law enforcement (Fassin 2011: 217). In Uganda, e-passports have recently been 
introduced. My informants from the immigration told me that they have to undergo special 
trainings in how to handle this type of document. There have also been recent institutional 
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changes in Uganda, for example the construction of One Stop Border Posts, and the plan-
ning of a second office of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control in Gulu. 
Further research will be needed to reflect on the impact of these changes on bureaucratic 
practices.  
Terming a person as an immigrant most often derives from bureaucratic categorization. 
Nevertheless, there are only few studies about migration that focus on state actors and 
bureaucratic practices. This is especially the case when it comes to inner-African migration. 
This study shows that the state’s perspective is crucial to understand the phenomenon. 
Therefore, more research is needed to reflect on differences and similarities of local immi-
gration law enforcement practices of African states. 
Inner-African migration to Northern Uganda is intensifying. The number of refugees hosted 
by Uganda is still on the rise because of the insurgencies in South Sudan, DRC and lately 
Burundi. At the same time, security discourses re-emerge in the context of the Al-Shabaab 
attacks on Garissa University in Kenya.78 During the last years, these discourses have led 
to the increase of border surveillance, and to the implementation of other strategies such 
as Post Entry Management. The latter contains audit checks where immigration law en-
forcement is ‘outsourced’ from office settings. Practices of immigration law enforcement in 
informal settings are less structured by bureaucratic routines, and more prone to negotia-
tion. In this study, most of the cases of informally paid money from immigrants to state 
officials were reported in this area of immigration law enforcement.  
Securitization is said to be a process of global scale, as well as the association of insecurity 
with immigration (Bakewell 2007: 16). In this context, nationalism, racial profiling and oth-
ering are widespread developments that are found in Uganda, but that also increase in 
Europe for example. The current increase of immigration law enforcement is meant to main-
tain security in Uganda. But at the same time, there are cases where it increases the inse-
curity of immigrants. Security is maintained one-sided in Uganda when it only refers to na-
tionals but leaves out immigrants.79 Immigrants including refugees and asylum seekers are 
now under permanent monitoring and constant suspicion. Their ignorance of the law and of 
their rights makes them easy targets for exploitation.                                                            
78
 Daily Monitor (2016): Security beefed up at border points. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/Na-
tional/Security-beefed-up-at-border-points/-/688334/2678556/-/fento0z/-/index.html (accessed May 
07, 2016).  
79
 Immigrants in Uganda are also targets of terrorism. One of the two targets of the attacks in Kam-
pala in 2010 was an Ethiopian restaurant in the area of Kabalagala where many Ethiopian and Eri-
trean immigrants live. It is said that the reason behind the attack was the military involvement of 
Ethiopia in Somalia (Al Jazeera [2010]: Al-Shabab claims Uganda bombings. http://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520 826984.html [accessed May 07, 2016]).  
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